The London Blasts: Media Review

DAY 68: 13 September 2005

POLICE TARGET ASIANS

POLICE TARGET ASIANS

That's right. The Independent's Chief Political Correspondent, Marie Woolf, has the story today: 'Anti-terror police told to target Asians'. (page 22) It seems this applies only to British Transport Police, who work on overground and underground trains. The instructions given to the police are contradictory:

'Officers patrolling on the Tube and train network, have been told not to "use stereotypical images of terrorists when deciding whether or not to use their powers of stop and search." But the operational order, issued after the July 7 attacks in London, which The Independent has seen, adds: "It should be noted, however, that recent suspects have included individuals of Asian, West Indian and east African origin, some of whom have British nationality." '

A British Transport Police told Marie Woolf:

'We are dealing with a terrorist attack from a particular source which is Islamic international terrorism and these are the people at that time who were responsible for these attacks. But it is not saying that they may be responsible in the future.'

'The people who carried out [the July attacks] are not representative of the British population. We are trying to stop people particular to the threat.We are saying to our officers, not all Asian people are terrorists but given we are looking at Islamic terrorists - if we were looking for Irish republican terrorists we would not be stopping Asian or black people.'

Setting aside issues of race and equality for the moment, there are two questions here from a security point of view.

DESIGN CRITERIA

Firstly, how to design a stop-and-search policy to cause the least alienation and anger among those supporters of al-Qaeda who might one day carry out a bombing on the public transport system.

Secondly, how to design a stop-and-search policy to be most effective in deterring a bomber from carrying a bomb onto the public transport system.

Both objectives are national security imperatives.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PREVENTION

There is a third objective, but before discussing it, we must distinguish between suicide and non-suicide attacks.

With suicide attacks of the 7/7 and 21/7 variety, the third option is not available. It is not possible to design a stop-and-search system to prevent a bomber from attacking. In the nature of things, when a suicide bomber is carrying an armed, hand-detonated device, stopping her or him cannot prevent an explosion, merely trigger its activation at a point of your choosing rather than of the bomber's choosing.

If this point of your choosing is at the entry to the public transport system, then casualties can be reduced sharply. If this point is inside the system, however, there might be little or no advantage in terms of human safety.

If, however, the device is on a timer, and cannot be hand-detonated, as in the Madrid bombings, then stop-and-search has a chance of preventing an explosion.

The police must try to manage both suicide and non-suicide threats.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DETERRENCE

It's clear that targeting Asians, West Indians and East Africans for stop-and-search will cause considerable alienation and anger among potential bombers. Is there a sufficient benefit in deterrence to outweigh the cost of increasing the pool of potential bombers?

Let us assume for the time being that the police are correct that the threat comes from the South Asian, West Indian and East African communities.

Concentrating on suicide bombers such as Mohammad Sidique Khan or Shehzad Tanweer, the two key figures in the 7/7 attacks, are such people likely to be deterred by the possibility of being stopped and searched on entry to the public transport system? It's possible. They might instead choose currently undefended mass casualty opportunities, in high streets, shopping centres, sports events, concerts.

Let's be clear. When we talk about 'deterring' a suicide bomber wishing to detonate their bomb on the public transport system, we are talking about deflecting such attacks onto other targets.

The drive to carry out such bombings does not diminish because they are slightly more difficult to execute on the public transport system.

When we are dealing with a determined suicide bomber with a hand-detonation system, 'deterrence' lies in the thwarting not of the explosion (we can't stop them exploding it at the point of stop-and-search), but the thwarting of their plan - reaching the 'correct' location, detonating at the 'correct' time.

HUMAN SACRIFICES

In the context of 7/7-type bombers, stop-and-search means setting up the police as tripwires, threatening to trigger explosions in places other than those planned, at times other than those planned.

The police officers are human sacrifices. If the attempted search is inside the system, they are not defenders, but merely initiators.

When the police initiate stop-and-search of a terrorist suspect, they are not increasing the security of the people around them. They are increasing - dramatically - the danger that the people around them will be caught in an explosion.

Would the danger of being forced to detonate your bomb 'early' stop 7/7-type bombers from trying to attack the public transport system? Possibly.

On the other hand, when someone has brought themselves to a peak of fanaticism and religious conviction, it might be quite easy to convince yourself that God will lead you to your objective without obstacles or hindrances.

COST-BENEFIT

Still assuming that the bombers are coming from the South Asian, West Indian or East African communities, would stop-and-search of young men appearing to come from such communities deter non-suicide-bombers of the Madrid variety from attacking the public transport system? Probably.

So the cost-benefit of racially-targeted stop-and-search on the public transport sytem looks like this, on police assumptions: unquantifiable cost in community relations (in terms of increasing the pool of potential bombers, reducing the provision of intelligence and co-operation from the community and so on) versus likely deflection of non-suicide bombers to other targets, and some decrease in the probability of suicide bomb attacks.

The cost is likely to be borne by young men of colour of highly Westernized dress and appearance (because suicide bombers are trying to blend in), and by young men in traditional non-Western dress (because they appear overly-religious). Westernized, integrated young men of colour will be alienated from the State and from British society. Young men who are religious will be further alienated from the State and from British society.

Is this a tolerable cost?

NON-RACIST POLICING

Let's examine the police assumption of the 'racial source' of the threat. What the Transport Police have still failed to grasp is that Islam is not a racist religion.

There are converts to Islam from every ethnic group. 'Racial profiling' and racially-driven stop-and-search will tend to favour al-Qaeda attackers who appear white. Such men (and possibly women, as in Palestine) will feel the anger and humiliation of their brothers who are being targeted by the police, because of their sense of solidarity as Muslims, but they will be able to attack the vulnerable areas of British society because they are not seen as 'Muslims'.

Many pertinent points on police racism are made in the Independent article:

"I am sure the Commission for Racial Equality would be keen to scrutinise this operational order. You can't say 'don't use stereotypes' and then say 'just watch out for this lot'," said Simon Woolley, of Operation Black Vote. "We desperately need to avoid the crude profiling that may have led to death of the innocent Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes. The officers jumped to a conclusion about him because he had a dark complexion. Strong intelligence-led policing is the only way to gain the confidence of the black and ethnic minority community and catch the criminals we all want caught."

Shami Chakrabati, head of Liberty, said... "This order is in real danger of breaching the Race Relations Act. You should stop and search a person who meets the description of a terror suspect, not look for needles in a haystack. We are really concerned by this. We will ask the chief constable for an explanation of this guidance. I look forward to meeting him."

Nick Harvey, a Liberal Democrat member of the Home Affairs Select Committee, said the advice sent mixed messages. "The whole thing is completely contradictory. It suggests it is open season on a couple of groups. Apart from the racial stereotyping, the parallel concern is that the guidance is so vague. It seems to be a tacit invitation to stop and search people from these racial groups. It's very bad policing."

If there were a dramatic security advantage in security to racial profiling, we would be discussing a possible trade-off between state racism and national security. There isn't, we aren't.

JNV welcomes feedback.