The London Blasts: Media Review

DAY 44: 20 August 2005

[Please note that information emerged which is discussed in the 21 August Media Review which substantially modifies the following comments.]

SHOOT TO KILL - NEW

The Metropolitan Police chief has now been accused of offering the de Menezes family $1 million compensation in return for their silence. The Times (page 6) reports:

'After what he describes as the worst week of his professional life, Sir Ian Blair learnt last night that he was also being accused by the parents of Jean Charles de Menezes of trying to buy their silence with a $1 million (£560,000) compensation offer.'

'Maria, Mr de Menezes’s mother, dismissed this as “blood money”, saying that no amount of cash would stop her coming to London to ask Sir Ian why he told lies about her son, who was shot when he was mistaken for a terrorist suspect on a Tube train at Stockwell station on July 22.'

'Discussions with the family about money were supposed to be confidential, but then every move Scotland Yard has made in recent days has only landed Sir Ian and his officers in more controversy.'

'Police said last night that it was pointless to deny making a $1 million offer because the de Menezes family would again dominate the headlines today.'

Much of the current controversy is turning around the delay in handing over the investigation of the Stockwell shooting to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The Telegraph (page 8) reports a plausible explanation for the apparent delay, meaning that this issue may fade from the scene.

This explanation begins with a different spin on the 'Commissioner tried to block the IPCC investigation' story reported two days ago. Without access to the crucial letter from Ian Blair, it is impossible to know which version of the story is correct:

'When it was thought that a suicide bomber had been killed, Sir Ian asked the Home Office whether the IPCC statutory involvement could be delayed as the counter-terrorism operation was in full swing, with suspects who tried to detonate bombs on July 21 still at large.'

'As soon as it was apparent that an innocent man had been shot, the scene was handed over to the Yard's Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS). It carried out a detailed investigation and took more than 160 witness statements that day.'

'Over the following weekend these were typed and recorded on the Met's Holmes database system. The day after the shooting, it was agreed that the IPCC would take over on Monday, July 25, because, say the police, they could not get staff in at the weekend.'

'One source said the only reason the full IPCC investigation did not start until July 27, five days after the shooting, was the huge amount of information to be disclosed together with all the exhibits from the scene and the SO19 firearms unit weapons.'

' ''The Holmes account then had to be handed over,'' said one officer. ''This all took time. There was no delay, it was just the amount of material which made it last until the Wednesday.'' '

There are varying predictions as to how long it will be before the various possible prosecutions and investigations might result in full disclosure of the facts to the public.

The only good news is that there is apparently a thorough-going review of the shoot-to-kill policy under way. The bad news is that it is not a public, accountable review, with democratic oversight, but an internal police matter.

Discussing Britain's record of slavery and slave-trading ('Britain was the principal slaving nation of the modern world'), Cambridge University historian Richard Drayton remarks in passing that African slavery and colonialism are not ancient or foreign history: they continue as a living part of the British experience:

'Had Africa's signature not been visible on the body of the Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes, would he have been gunned down on a tube at Stockwell? The slight kink of the hair, his pale beige skin, broadcast something misread by police as foreign danger.'

'In that sense, his shooting was the twin of the axe murder of Anthony Walker in Liverpool, and of the more than 100 deaths of black people in mysterious circumstances while in police, prison or hospital custody since 1969.'

Following on from yesterday's discussion of the place of apology in politics, Drayton remarks:

'Early this year, Gordon Brown told journalists in Mozambique that Britain should stop apologising for colonialism. The truth is, though, that Britain has never even faced up to the dark side of its imperial history, let alone begun to apologise.'

SHOOT TO KILL - OLD

Columnist Vicki Woods relates an interesting personal experience of 'attempted racial targeting' in the Telegraph, which ends with a reference to the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes and to the earlier era of "shoot to kill":

'I can't be alone in finding extra-judicial execution on the streets of London extremely hard to accept. Back in 1985, when the SAS shot and killed the three IRA terrorists on the streets of Gibraltar, I stopped reading the newspapers. (Which was pretty unprofessional, since I was working on one, but I couldn't stand the Gotcha! headlines.) There was no bomb there, either. Not in Gibraltar, at least. Only the late Auberon Waugh raised a lonely voice in fury and condemnation.'

As we pointed out in our first comment on this tragedy, the earlier use of the term 'shoot to kill', in the context of Britain's war with the IRA, meant a policy of deliberately creating situations in which IRA members (or suspected members) could be executed rather than arrested. There was a prior intention to kill one or more IRA volunteer(s) (perhaps particular individuals who were particularly troublesome), and a plan was devised to create a situation in which the police or army could 'shoot to kill/execute rather than arrest' with apparent justification.

This seems to be different from the case of Jean Charles de Menezes, where from the accounts available (and judging from the overall pattern of police activity since 7 July) the Metropolitan police had no prior intention to kill suspects rather than arrest them.

DEATH ON THE ROCK

The most famous incident in the era of "shoot to kill/execute rather than arrest" was the shooting dead by members of the SAS of three unarmed IRA members on the Rock of Gibraltar, which was the subject of a famous BBC documentary entitled 'Death on the Rock':

'The programme interviewed witnesses who claimed to have heard no prior warning given by the SAS troops and to have seen the shooting as one carried out "in cold blood." Furthermore, the defence that the IRA team might, if allowed time, have had the capacity to trigger by remote control a car bomb in the main street, was also subject to criticism, including that from an Army bomb disposal expert.' (Museum of Broadcast Communications)

The case went to the European Court of Human Rights, which found in 1995 that the shooting of Mairead Farrell, Sean Savage, and Daniel McCann was illegal under human rights law:

'In sum, having regard to the decision not to prevent the suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the failure of the authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that their intelligence assessments might, in some respects at least, be erroneous and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when the soldiers opened fire, the Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2 para. 2 (a) (art. 2-2-a) of the [European Human Rights] Convention.'

This paragraph reads:

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person unlawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.

The Court decided that there was no premeditated plan to execute the three IRA members. Others were not convinced (see 'Ambush' section below).

BACKGROUND READING

There are two classic texts on the "shoot to kill" policy in relation to Northern Ireland: Mark Urban's Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against The IRA (1992), and Raymond Murray's The SAS In Ireland (1990).

The first is by a former Army officer, Defence Correspondent at the Independent, and now Diplomatic Editor for Newsnight on BBC television. The second is by a Catholic priest, a human rights campaigner and prison chaplain who 'was prompted to begin gathering information on the SAS by the killing of Peter Cleary, a young man who had come 50 yards across the border from the Irish republic to see his girlfriend in the north.' (Green Left Weekly, Australia) Both books are flawed in various ways, and must be read carefully, but they contain valuable information.

Other important books on this period are Who Framed Colin Wallace by Paul Foot (Wallace was involved in British army covert propaganda unit in Northern Ireland), War Without Honour by Captain Fred Holroyd (who was involved in British army intelligence in the North of Ireland at the same time), and Stalker by John Stalker, the Manchester policeman who was removed from his position leading an investigation of 'shoot to kill' allegations - because he was too honest and thorough, it appears. Once again, caution is in order, but the era of 'shoot to kill' can hardly be understood without these three memoirs.

Incidentally, the book Shoot To Kill by Michael Asher, who served in the British Army in Northern Ireland, is not concerned with this topic, but is required reading for understanding part of the story of 'the Troubles'. Asher served in the Parachute Regiment, and describes their mentality thus:

'The circumstances of our training, coupled with the peculiar nature of our existence in Northern Ireland - a blend of boredom, frustration and occasional terror - turned us into savages. We begged and prayed for a chance to fight, to smash, to kill, to destroy: we were fire-eating beserkers, a hurricane of human brutality ready to burst forth on anyone or anything that stood in our way. We were unreligious, apolitical and remorseless, a caste of warrior-janizaries who worshipped at the high altar of violence and wanted nothing more.' (page 120)

Shoot To Kill is an articulate and intelligent successor to another articulate (foul-mouthed) and intelligent memoir, Captain A.F.N. Clarke's Contact, another essential part of the modern history of Northern Ireland. Captain Clarke also served in the Parachute Regiment in Northern Ireland, but in the 1970s. Clarke records a brief period in the early 1970s when the Army was permitted to take action against Protestant loyalists, including the following minor incident, which says volumes for the reality of army operations:

'At night, we're getting really good at digging out all the flotsam and jetsam and assembling them on the street in long rows with hands against the wall, legs spread, waiting for long minutes whilst I carry out lengthy P. Checks and detailed questions, just waiting for someone to say something out of place to provide an excuse for physical intimidation... Tonight we are really having fun, with about fifty guys lining the walls of the Shankill Road, their kidneys taking a pounding from batons whenever the mistake of making a protest is made. I'm walking slowly along the line asking questions, any that don't reply are taken quickly round the corner and the muffled thud and grunts can be heard clearly by the others still with their fingers on the wall.' (pages 56-57)

(Clips from the film based on Contact are available here.)

Before leaving the topic of covert military operations in Northern Ireland, there is the later period of security force extra-judicial killings covered by Sean McPhilemy in his book The Committee, which documents the collaboration of loyalist paramilitaries, the Northern Ireland police (the RUC - Royal Ulster Constabulary), the local military (UDR - Ulster Defence Regiment) and leading unionist politicians and business figures. This book, and the television programme it is based on, were the subject of intensive legal proceedings, including some against Amazon for distributing it. The case against the television programme nearly caused the destruction of Channel 4. McPhilemy was later successful in a libel case against the Sunday Times on these issues. The Committee is not available in the UK, but can be ordered by airmail from Amazon US.

AMBUSH

Mark Urban comments on the Gibraltar deaths:

'During the inquest in 1988 into the deaths of three IRA members in Gibraltar, the SAS officer "Soldier F" denied suggestions that the decision to mount an ambush contained an assumption that the enemy party would be killed. He said that the aim of an ambush might also be to take prisoners.' (page 162)

Urban refers to the British Army manual Land Operations Volume III - Counter-Revolutionary Operations, which was then in force for Northern Ireland-type operations. 'Land Operations' says:

'An ambush is a surprise attack by a force lying in wait upon a moving or temporarily halted enemy.'

Urban adds:

'Land Operations makes clear that an ambush is an attack and implies that any prisoners, if it is part of the mission to take them, are survivors of such an assault. The manual deals with the arrest of terrorists under a different section. It goes on:

"The aim of an ambush is thus usually achieved by concentrating heavy accurate fire from concealed positions in to carefully selected killing areas which the enemy have been allowed to enter, but from which their escape is prevented by fire and possibly obstacles."

'It adds that such an attack would only normally be used in "Setting 4", a counter-insurgency campaign verging on limited war in which the security forces had lost control of certain areas.' (page 162)

Urban comments that the increasing flow of information reaching British security chiefs in the early 1980s 'meant that they sometimes had foreknowledge of terrorist attacks'. They then had a choice. Urban quotes 'someone who has run operations by the SAS in Northern Ireland':

'There are two options - either to arrest with irrefutable evidence on which to base a prosecution or the other, which is to go in and shoot. The chances of being able to make an arrest under those conditions are minimal because the terrorists will be armed.' (page 162)

If the terrorists decide to mount an attack, and the security forces pre-empt them with an ambush, 'then the officer adds, "the outcome is pretty obvious".' (page 162)

Urban comments that the change of British policy in 1983 was 'was a shift - on some occasions at least - to the second of his options, the shooting option'. (pages 162-3)

He then presents an exchange with a member of the SAS:

URBAN: What is the mission on an ambush?

SAS MAN: You know what the mission is on an ambush, everybody knows what the mission is in an ambush.

URBAN: Tell me what you think it is.

SAS MAN: I know that when you do an ambush you kill people. (page 164)

Urban summarises the post-1983 policy:

'There is no shoot-to-kill policy in the sense of a blanket order to shoot IRA terrorists on sight. Rather the knack is to get IRA terrorists, armed and carrying out an operation, to walk into a trap. Killing an unarmed IRA member may create a martyr, but if the same person were carrying a gun, even committed republicans may feel the operation was, in some sense, fair... Some of those who have carried out covert operations in Ulster [Northern Ireland] refer to lethal force being used in such a way as to appear fair and within the law as the "clean kill".' (page 164)

Urban bases his analysis on interviews with senior figures within the security forces:

'Perhaps the most compelling explanation for what the security forces sought to achieve when they returned to a policy of occasional ambushes is provided by a senior figure at Stormont [the seat of government in Northern Ireland]. He says that the idea of mounting such operations "is to give the IRA an occasional rap across the knuckles, something which may deter them from carrying out more attacks." '

'Another explanation for the use of ambushes is given by a one-time senior officer at Lisburn [British Army headquarters in Northern Ireland]. He acknowledges that such operations may provide the IRA with martyrs, but believes they can offer the chance to deal with specific individuals, saying "The balance of advantage to us or them may be very questionable. There comes a time when we say, "We need a kill" - such and such a person is a thorn in our side and we've got to do something about him." ' (page 169)

Urban remarks that after the arrival of the SAS in Northern Ireland in 1976, there was a spate of SAS operations/ambushes killing seven IRA men until 1978. Then there was a gap of five years which resulted not necessarily from a less aggressive policy, but 'to some extent from the RUC's desire to take on the more adventurous side of covert operations itself.' (page 242)

LOUGHGALL

An example of an SAS ambush:

On 8 May 1987, eight IRA men attacked Loughgall police station with a bomb loaded on digger. Because the attack came after 7pm, when the police station closed, 'it would appear that their aim was not to kill but to destroy police stations, as they had done' before. (Big Boys' Rules, page 227)

Several days beforehand, the British army, knowing of the impending attack, decided to mount what one officer briefed on the operation described as 'a massive ambush', bringing over an extra 15 SAS soldiers to back up the 24 already in Northern Ireland.

'At least fifty of the Army's and the RUC's troops most highly trained in surveillance techniques and the use of firearms were committed to the immediate operation, and several companies of UDR and regular Army soldiers as well as mobile police squads were to be available to cordon off the Armagh/Dungannon area. Loughgall was to be an operation involving hundreds of soldiers and police.' (Big Boys' Rules, page 228)

SAS soldiers were placed inside the otherwise empty police station that the security forces knew was to be the target for a bomb attack, putting them at some considerable risk.

'The SAS commander's decision to put men inside the police station may have owed something to the philosophy of the "clean kill"... An SAS man explained to me the commander's decision to put men inside the police station in the following terms: "The Yellow Card rules [of engagement] are officially seen to cover Loughgall, but of course they don't. You put your men in the station. That way they [the IRA] are threatening you without even knowing it. That's how you get around the Yellow Card.' (Big Boys' Rules, page 230)

Hundreds of bullets were fired, including into the wall of the chuch hall, 'where children were playing.' (Big Boys' Rules, page 233)

Brothers Oliver and Anthony Hughes were driving past the church towards the RUC station when the firing started, and sensibly began reversing. They were shot by another part of the ambush group. 'It appeared that the SAS men had poured fire into the car without issuing any challenge or knowing who was in it.' Anthony Hughes died. Oliver Hughes was shot three times in his back and one bullet went into his head, but he survived. (page 233)

There were various alternative options which would have put the people of Loughgall at less risk (the bomb was actually exploded, despite the massive firepower directed at the eight IRA men). Urban points out that the storage location of the explosives used was known beforehand. The explosives could have been made inert, preventing any explosion.

'That they did not render the explosives safe may be seen in terms of their desire for a "clean kill" - had the men been shot at the site without the digger blowing up, it would have been harder to justify the need for an ambush.' (page 234)

In other words, the village of Loughgall was put at risk from the bomb in order to provide a better propaganda cover for the unnecessary execution of eight IRA militants.

The men could have been arrested when they came to fit the explosives to the digger. Or they could have been allowed to carry out the attack and then been arrested on the way home.

Arrest was not the aim. Prevention of risk to the people of Loughgall was not the aim.

The aim was explained to Urban by a 'senior security forces officer who played a key role in the operation':

'Loughgall was a plum - it was an exceptionally heavy team of good [IRA] operators. The temptation was there to remove them in one go. The terrorists played into our hands and everything went our way. Was it a decision to kill those people? I don't think it would have been phrased like that. Someone would have said, "How far do we go to remove this group of terrorists?" and the answer would have been, "As far as necessary." ' (page 236)

They were to be 'removed' not by arrest, trial and prison, but by execution. Everything went the security forces' way, but it didn't go that way for Oliver Hughes.

This is state terrorism. It is part of the background to the crisis we now face. The "shoot to kill" policy in Ireland has only a tangential relation to the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, but it is indicative of the true face of British force as it has been experienced around the world.

Those of us who have not been at the wrong end of the guns need to learn some of these realities if we are to engage with the situation that faces us now.

JNV welcomes feedback.