The London Blasts: Media Review

ONE MONTH ON

DAY 38: 14 August 2005

LISTEN CAREFULLY / IGNORE CAREFULLY

There is an astonishing editorial in the Observer today, entitled 'Listen carefully: Young Muslims deserve to be heard'. This warns the media against turning to 'community leaders' who do not actually represent the community (in this case the Muslim community), especially the younger members of the community.

The main recommendation: 'The government needs to launch a wide-ranging consultation and ask Britain's Muslim community who, if not their MPs, might represent their views fairly. It must also listen to the answer.'

The purpose of the editorial is really to attack the Muslim Council of Britain (the Observer has a main front page story dedicated to this, and a long inside pages hatchet job).

Leaving aside the rights and wrongs of the MCB, the Panorama programme being made about the MCB, and the way that the Observer has reported these issues, let us return to the injunction to 'listen carefully'.

For over a month now, the British media has 'listened' - sometimes carefully - to young Muslims all over the country. What has emerged is summarized in an article in two short paragraphs in Newsweek:

'If you were to ask a moderate Muslim whether he wanted the American military out of Muslim lands, "the answer would be the same as bin Laden's," argues Imran Khan, a British Muslim documentary filmmaker. "If you were to ask moderate Muslims whether they consider Egypt's Hosni Mubarak a dictator, their answer would also be exactly the same as bin Laden's. The beef we've got is exactly the same. The only way we differ is methodology." '

'That's a colossal difference, and one of the themes crackling through the profiles that follow. Some of these young(ish) British Muslims may sound radical, and the Hizb ut-Tahrir leader certainly is. But their anger at what they see as Western aggression against the Muslim world isn't. Understanding that anger—and listening, even while cracking down on criminals killing in its name—is crucial. Get it wrong, and you could have a new generation of homegrown jihadists.'

The message has been simple, and it has been delivered to the Prime Minister himself - by the Home Office and Foreign Office, in their report on Young Muslims and Extremism: 'It seems that a particularly strong cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims including young Muslims is a perceived `double standard' in the foreign policy of western governments (and often those of Muslim governments), in particular Britain and the US.'

At every level of the Muslim community, this message has been repeated over and over. Even Shahid Malik, New Labour MP for Dewsbury, wrote in the FT, 'We know what drives these young men: the feelings of isolation and disaffection, the political anger at what they see as the double standards of the west in relation to international Muslim areas of conflict, whether that be Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq or Chechnya, and, the hatred propagated by domestic extremists such as the BNP.'

The white non-Muslim media has listened to young Muslims, and to others in the Muslim community, and now pretends it hasn't heard what has been said.

Listen again: the anger that explodes bombs here is generated by British state violence abroad.

That is not a justification, it is an explanation. If we want to prevent more bombs going off, we will try to change the circumstances that produce bombers. If we ignore what has been said, and we do nothing to change the underlying circumstances, more bombers will rise up out of nowhere, and more people will be murdered - in part as a result of the wilful ignorance and willing subservience of the mass media.

SHOOT TO KILL: NEW INFORMATION

The Observer has a special report on the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, which includes the following:

'Initial claims that de Menezes was targeted because he was wearing a bulky coat, refused to stop when challenged and then vaulted the ticket barriers have all turned out to be false.

'He was wearing a denim jacket, used a standard Oyster electronic card to get into the station and simply walked towards the platform unchallenged.'

'It has also been suggested that officers did not identify themselves properly before shooting de Menezes seven times in the head.'

No source is given from these claims, or for the reported police statement that the CCTV cameras in Stockwell underground station (and on the tube train itself) were not working.

It is difficult to evaluate the validity of this report.

Tony Thompson also reports on the events leading up to the shootings:

'After 21 July officers also examined information found within the unexploded device recovered from the top deck of the No 26 bus in Hackney. The Observer understands that, although information within the bag pointed to an address in Tulse Hill, it was not clear whether it had been placed there as a red herring or whether it was the address of one of the bombers.'

'The address was the same block of nine flats, spread over three stories, where de Menezes lived with his cousins. By that same evening, the block was under close surveillance by a specialist, unarmed police team.'

'Wary of the experience of officers in Madrid who, having tracked down bombers to an apartment block, burst in just as the terrorists blew themselves up, killing one policeman in the process, detectives began a race against time to obtain information about the layout of the block in an attempt to ascertain exactly where the bombers were likely to be. They then began drawing up a plan to assault the block.'

'At around 10am that Friday morning, officers watching the address saw a man, de Menezes, emerge from the communal entrance. He had received a phone call earlier asking him to fix a fire alarm at a property in Kilburn, north London. But the police thought they might, just, have someone important in their sights.'

'De Menezes was followed for five minutes as he walked to a bus stop, He then boarded a No 2 bus, along with several plainclothes officers who, again, were unarmed. The officers hoped de Menezes might lead them to some of the men pictured on the CCTV stills.'

'At some point de Menezes phoned a colleague saying he would be arriving late because tube services were disrupted as a result of the previous day's incidents. It is not clear whether members of the surveillance team heard this conversation. De Menezes was on the bus for a further 15 minutes until he reached Stockwell station.'

'The surveillance team were under strict instructions not to allow de Menezes to board a train and a rapid decision was made to arrest him using armed officers, a procedure known as a 'hard stop'. But because the officers in the surveillance team had no weapons, they had to change places with officers from SO19, the Metropolitan Police firearms unit.'

'By the time the armed officers arrived, De Menezes was already inside, using his Oyster card to enter the station and casually walking down the escalator towards the platform.'

'The number of armed officers in the Metropolitan Police had been increased last January in response to a potential terrorist threat as part of a revaluation of resources following 11 September. At the same time a number of officers were given specific training on how to deal with suicide bombers. The training was based on the experience of police and military units in countries such as Israel and Sri Lanka where similar attacks are common.'

'By studying footage of attacks and even interviewing failed bombers, senior Met officers drew up a list of 'precursor signals' that generally occur shortly before detonation of a device. Most have not been made public but include the potential bomber looking 'detached' from his or her surroundings and becoming introspective.'

'In such situations new guidance suggested the officers shoot the suspect in the head rather than the torso as the latter would not stop a detonation and might even ignite the explosive.'

'Officers are also warned that potential bombers will detonate at the slightest inkling that they have been identified. This means they will not identify themselves until absolutely necessary.'

The Observer is implying, but not claiming that Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead by a group of undercover police who did not wear any identifying clothing, who did not identify themselves as police officers verbally, and who did not challenge him to halt or surrender before shooting him.

The Observer is also suggesting that the clothing and behaviour of Jean Charles de Menezes was not suspicious, as the police have claimed.

It remains to be seen where the truth lies.

JNV welcomes feedback.