The London Blasts: Media Review

ONE MONTH ON

DAY 31: Sunday 7 August 2005

THE BAER CONUNDRUM

Something odd has happened to Robert Baer, the presenter of Channel 4's 'The Cult of The Suicide Bomber'.

STAGE 1

As regular readers will recall, shortly before the Media Review was suspended, we reported an important interview in The Times with Baer, in which the former CIA officer told The Times, that the al Qaeda insurgency is not about hating the Western way of life: 'it wasn’t our values. It wasn’t Western values. It’s Western presence. They want us to get out.'

Andrew Billen asked Baer: if we want to stop being attacked, what do our governments have to do?

Baer said, 'The first thing is get out of Iraq. To pretend this has nothing to do with Iraq is idiocy. I mean, I don’t know if it’s in the back of these people’s minds or if they think about it all day long, but what they see is that we attack Muslims, we provoke the killing of Muslims, Shia or Sunni, we provoke what they call "fitna", which is chaos among the Muslims. They see it as neo-colonialism, hate for Muslims. And the same thing with the Palestinians. They do not believe that Israel is an accident, that it was founded from a feeling of guilt after the Second World War. They think it’s an attack from the West, an outpost of Western colonialism.'

The subtitle of the interview-article summed up Baer's views: 'it's not the West's values, but its foreign policies that are to blame'.

STAGE 2

The following day, Baer was interviewed by the Guardian's Stephen Moss, and said something rather different.

Buried in the middle of the article (which does not have a similarly blunt subtitle or title as Andrew Billen's), Baer does give an analysis of what turns young men into suicide bombers that Moss describes as 'vivid and heartfelt':

' "Every time you kill a Muslim, whether it's an Israeli killing them or an American or a Brit, there is humiliation, anger, reaction and bombs go off somewhere." [Baer] believes the allied intervention in Iraq was a disaster and has triggered the bombing campaign in London. "I was in Baghdad at the end of the [second Gulf] war. You could see the US military had destroyed every piece of armour the Iraqis owned. Not only armour but museums, too, cultural looting, the destruction of all infrastructure. It was a war against the Iraqi state, against an Arab country. That creates the humiliation and anger which fuel suicide bombing attacks. If you keep it up, you're going to get hit. You can't go randomly kill Muslims and not expect a reaction here." '

However, this paragraph is preceded by the following exchange. Moss asks the hard question: what should we do in Iraq:

'He thinks the situation is hopeless. "If it goes very badly in Iraq and we leave, the Arabs and the Iranians will be pulled into the war one way or another, either through surrogates or directly. If it stays chaotic, the chaos will migrate to the other side of the Gulf." So what is the answer? "I don't know. I've moved to Colorado and have a wood-burning stove." '

One day Baer tells The Times we have to get out of Iraq, as a first step in preventing more attacks.

The next day he says he doesn't know what to do about Iraq.

Rather odd.

STAGE 3

Then today, in the Observer, Baer has a long article on the London bombings in which he has some perceptive comments to make about the bombers (to which we return), but in answer to his own question, 'How can you fight suicide terrorism in Britain?', Baer answers with police, intelligence and deportation (not that far off the Blair agenda). There is a single sentence of realism in the following paragraph, but it is drowned out by the rest of the article (eight paragraphs discussing policing), and effectively erased:

'Like all cults, the cult of suicide bombing feeds upon itself. Log on to the internet or visit a militant Islamic bookshop and within a few minutes you will find enough inspiration in CDs, ranting sermons, DVDs, for a hundred suicide bombs. It swirls across the Islamic world as an expression of rage against the West for the invasion of Iraq, support for Israel, and for Western dominance of the world economy.'

In its final paragraphs, having surveyed the intelligence/police challenge involved, the article concludes that 'even these measures will not make the threat of suicide bombing disappear'. At last, you may think, a repetition of Baer's comments to Andrew Billen about the need for policy change.

But no, Baer finishes his article with some Muslim-bashing:

'The only real solution lies within Islam itself. It is only when the vast majority of law-abiding Muslim societies reject the cultural virus of suicide bombing and cease to glorify it that this plague will burn itself out. Until then we must be on our guard, always, night and day.'

It is now the Muslim community that must take on the burden of eradicating the anger and hatred caused by Western foreign policy. When only five days ago, Baer was saying, 'It wasn’t Western values. It’s Western presence. They want us to get out.'

Something odd has happened to Robert Baer, but it's not clear what it is. Perhaps worth writing to the Observer about?

THE PERPETRATORS: SELF-STARTERS

BAER'S TAKE

'The first thing we have to do is understand the nature of our enemy. We are continually looking for the one foreign, turbaned, mastermind who we secretly hope will be responsible for everything. Kill him and our nightmare is over.'

'But instead of watching al-Zawahri ranting on al-Jazeera television why don't we look at the evidence?'

'The youngest 7 July suicide bomber, Hasib Hussain, was just 18 when he blew himself up on the Number 30 bus in Tavistock Square. At 18, Hussain was simply too young to have been indoctrinated in some Al-Qaeda camp in the wilds of Afghanistan or to have met bin Laden - who went on the run in November 2001 as US forces invaded.'

'The fourth July 7 bomber Germaine Lindsay, again just 19, was not even born Muslim. His family were Jamaican Christians who converted to Islam when he was in his teens.'

'How long will it be before we see the first white Muslim convert suicide bomber?'

'Chillingly, both Hussain and Lindsay, British citizens, were indoctrinated into becoming suicide bombers on British soil undoubtedly by another British citizen. Perhaps the oldest bomber, Mohammad Sidique Khan. Again, I am not surprised.'

'You are fighting an enemy within. An enemy that can spring up like a virus from nowhere without reference to any far-flung leader or foreign terrorist organisation. And all they need to get into the killing business is a list of instructions on how to make explosives from the internet and their own willingness to die.'

PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT: SUNDAY TIMES

In possibly the most important terrorism-related story in today's British newspapers, David Leppard and Robert Winnet set out in The Sunday Times the interim conclusions of the 7/7 and 21/7 investigations:

'[S]enior police and counter-terrorism sources... said they had found no evidence linking the four July 7 London bombers to Al-Qaeda or any other known terrorist organisation. Instead, investigators involved in the painstaking reconstruction of the lives of the men have provisionally concluded they were “unaffiliated terrorists” who were most likely inspired rather than directed by Al-Qaeda.'

'A Special Branch report circulated to senior police commanders last week is also said to have concluded there was “no control” over the two groups of men from any known terrorist commander.'

'In stark contrast to initial views that the attacks were centrally organised by the Al-Qaeda leadership under Osama Bin Laden, it now appears that both cells may have been “self-starters”; do-it-yourself groups of radicalised young men who decided to express their faith by plotting to blow themselves up, killing dozens of others in the process.'

'The conclusion is that the two plots were not linked, but appear to have surfaced almost entirely independently.'

'As one of the country’s most senior police officers put it last week: “It would seem that these men just appear to have got together by themselves and gone out there to do evil.” '

'While surprising and still provisional, this assessment of the July attacks is the latest manifestation of an emerging consensus about the new Al-Qaeda threat to Britain. This has far-reaching implications for the ability of the security services to win the war on terror.'

'In the campaign against the IRA, a key strategy was infiltration of the republican command structure. If the new terrorist enemy has no such structure, where does the fight begin? Indeed, who and where is the enemy? It is so atomised it is invisible.'

'The new breed of unaffiliated terrorist is potentially far more dangerous than the IRA or even Al-Qaeda because he is almost impossible to identify. It also explains why the July 7 and July 21 attacks caught MI5 off guard, with none of the attackers on the intelligence radar. The gap - between what the security services know and what they need to know in order to prevent the next atrocity - has dramatically widened...'

'In Rome, investigators looking into the role of Hamdi Isaac, also known as Hussain Osman, one of the key suspects in the July 21 attacks who was arrested after he fled, have reached the conclusion that these attacks were probably unconnected to any larger terrorism network.'

'Their findings appear to confirm a new analysis of the threat from Al-Qaeda that has emerged in the past two years. On this view the senior leadership group around Osama Bin Laden has been isolated and disrupted by successes in the West’s war on terror. This has undermined its ability to have operational control over individuals and attack planning.'

'Instead Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his so-called “deputy”, have become propagandists rather than operational leaders for the proliferating Islamist terror cells now emerging in the West...'

'Explaining the shift to a new type of Al-Qaeda threat, officials refer to the way MI5 has reclassified Al-Qaeda-related terrorism into three categories.'

'The first is the “Al-Qaeda core”: Bin Laden and his chiefs who directly commanded attacks such as the September 11, 2001, bombings in America.'

'The second tier involves “Al-Qaeda affiliates”: locally run groups such as those led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq or the Moroccan Combat Group, which was behind the Casablanca suicide attacks in 2003. These are structured terrorist organisations that work as local “franchises” — sub-contractors — to Al-Qaeda.'

'Beneath them is a third tier of Al-Qaeda “followers” who are not affiliated to any group. These can be loners or they could be larger groups that appear to have goaded themselves into action.'

'The provisional assessment now circulating in Whitehall is that the two alleged cells behind the July 7 and 21 attacks appear to belong to this third level.'

' “The killer evidence that points to a known Al-Qaeda operative or any operational command from Al-Qaeda is just not there,” a senior intelligence official said. “We want to keep an open mind, but at this stage it looks like they may have been unaffiliated.” '

PROVISIONAL ASSESSMENT: INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY

The Independent on Sunday carries a similar, but less detailed, report:

'Holed up somewhere between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Zawahiri and Bin Laden almost certainly knew nothing in advance of the 7 and 21 July attacks. Nor is it likely that they are aware of what might be coming next. But that is not the point: as security experts have been pointing out for some time, al-Qa'ida is now an ideology and an inspiration rather than an organisation directing acts of terrorism, although that does not make it any less dangerous, in the view of George Kassimeris, a terrorism expert at the University of Wolverhampton.'

' "In the kind of terrorism we are experiencing now, ideological training is more important than logistical or operational training," said Dr Kassimeris. "For al-Qa'ida, propaganda and symbolism are massive assets, which is why Zawahiri spoke exactly four weeks after the 7 July bombings. He wanted to aggravate British fear and insecurity." '

'If al-Qa'ida were a coherent network, it might actually make the task of the police and security services slightly easier as they seek to head off further attacks. Instead, the little that has emerged from the investigations into 7 and 21 July has simply made the threat seem more amorphous and confusing.'

'Far from requiring large amounts of money, training and co-ordination, the attacks appear to have been largely spontaneous and self-generated.'

'Hussain Osman, suspected of the attempted bombing of a train at Shepherd's Bush, is reported to have told his interrogators in Rome, where he was arrested on the strength of a British tip-off, that the conspirators were angered by Iraq rather than fired by extreme Islamist ideology. Instead of praying, they gathered in the basement of a gym, where they discussed the news and their jobs, and watched videos of the fighting in Iraq.'

'An Italian police official, Carlo de Stefano, said Osman had no links to known terrorist cells. He added that investigations "lead us to believe as very probable that he belongs to a spontaneous group rather than a structured organisation that had broader terrorist projects". The suspect, who used to live in Italy, was described by a former girlfriend as her "handsome Hamdi-Bambi", who loved rap music, America and girls.'

'The history of the 7 July bombers, said Dr Kassimeris, emphasised what he called "the ordinariness of terrorism". He added: "It is the 'boy next door' syndrome. These people are not superhuman, but nor are they brainless losers, as some have sought to depict them." '

'This, however, makes them harder to detect. "We have learnt that a very small group of determined people can inflict a great amount of damage, but until last month we have been looking in the wrong places and following the wrong targets. We are not dealing with groups of full-time terrorists, but people who engage in terrorism almost as a kind of hobby.'

' "And terrorists do copy one another. In an earlier era the Red Brigades in Italy copied the Red Army Faction in Germany, which copied Action Directe in France, and the same thing is happening now. They learn from each others' mistakes." '

'Thanks to American officials who have passed on to the US media what they have been told by their British counterparts, we know that considerable advances have been made in some areas of the investigation into the July bombings.'

'The 7 July bombs were initially thought to have been made from military explosive, then from TATP, a peroxide-based material which can be made from easily obtainable ingredients. But New York detectives told a public briefing that both the 7 and 21 July bombs were made from HMTD, another volatile home-brewed explosive which can be concocted from hair bleach, food preservatives and the kind of tablets used in self-heating rations.'

'To the horror of London investigators, the New York police officials went on to reveal that the 7 July bombs were detonated by the alarm setting on mobile phones, while those a fortnight later were rigged to detonate by hand.'

'It also emerged that the [7/7] suicide bombers had bought industrial refrigerators to store the explosive they made in a shabby Leeds flat, and used cool boxes to transport their bombs in two cars as far as Luton, from where they took a train to London. Their operation appears considerably more professional than the attempted bombings two weeks later, where less careful handling of the explosive may have made it deteriorate to the point of uselessness.'

So the type of explosive was similar (if not identical), and the targets were similar, but the detonation system was completely different, the preparation and transportation process was markedly different, and, we might add, the symbolism of the timing of the bombings seems quite bizarrely different also.

HOW CAN WE STOP THE INVISIBLE?

The lead story on this topic in the Independent on Sunday is an alarming (front-page) warning from investigators:

'intelligence agencies are warning the Government that Britain is facing a potential insurgency rather than a sporadic campaign of terrorist acts. Their assessment is based on the fact that the country is harbouring tens of thousands of young men from the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and its neighbours who can handle an automatic weapon. An estimated 10 per cent have basic training in light weapons and military explosives. Even though the vast majority have come to Britain to escape the lawlessness of their homelands, there remains an alarmingly large pool of people who are open to radicalisation and already have the capacity for armed violence.'

To put this in context, the more destructive attack in London was carried out by British citizens who seem to have been self-taught in explosives. On the one hand, this blurs the focus on the immigrant/refugee population. On the other, it expands the potential pool of al Qaeda recruits.

With the best will in the world, how can the intelligence services and the police be expected to detect these tiny friendship groups before they take violent action?

Jason Burke has some useful comments in the Observer, in a piece entitled, 'Seven ways to stop the terror':

'1 We need to recognise that 'al-Qaeda' is an ideology, not an organisation. There is no point in talking about masterminds or hunting for a global headquarters. There are none.'

'2 We need to stop confusing justification with explanation. Learning what motivates enemies does not mean sympathising with them. Merely saying that the bombers are mad, when there is no evidence that militants are mentally ill or backward, and when contemporary radical Islam clearly has its roots in the conditions of the modern world, does not help.'

'3 We should ditch the rhetoric. There is no point in saying, 'We will never surrender to terrorism,' when history tells us that, in order to manage a terrorist threat, successive governments in the UK and abroad always mixed 'hard' coercive measures, such as those announced by Tony Blair last week, with a 'soft' political strategy that undercuts the legitimacy of the militants' claims. Representatives of the IRA are in our parliament. The Egyptians and Algerians ended their mass Islamic insurgencies of the early nineties with judicious concessions as well as repression. The Americans blithely admitted recently to talks with Iraqi insurgents.'

'4 We need to recognise that doing things that enrage millions, even if we feel that anger is wrong-headed and misdirected, will make us more of a target. Before the invasion of Iraq the UK was fairly low down the target list for the militants. Now, Britain has joined Israel and America at its top. It is impossible to speak with any credibility to young British Muslims - or any young Muslims - without admitting this.'

'5 The 7 July bombers were not 'brainwashed' by anyone. Radical Islam provided them with an explanation of what was happening in the world and suggested actions that made sense to them. So we need a broad range of measures to ensure that such ideologies are less likely to convince in the future. If we cannot negotiate with existing militants, we can at least stop the next wave of recruits.'

'Some causes of terrorism do exist within the UK...'

'But the real causes are international - and can be dealt with through real policies. Militants often cite Chechnya, Kashmir and Palestine as examples of western oppression of Muslims. In each case, complex historical, political and economic factors have combined to sustain conflict. But with sufficient will and attention, and a balanced, tough-minded approach, solutions are possible. Merely making an obvious effort to solve problems in a fair-minded way would be extremely helpful in restoring the goodwill many in the Islamic world once felt towards Britain.'

In other words, in order to stop the invisible self-starting video-watching do-it-yourself friendship groups from launching new attacks, the British people must force the British government to change its foreign policies. (Curiously, Burke does not mention Iraq or Afghanistan, perhaps because of his personal commitment to the continuation of current policies in those countries.)

If we can't find such people before they attack, the only serious way of preventing their attacks is to reduce their motivation to attack.

MORE REALISM - FRANK GARDNER

BBC Correspondent Frank Gardner speaks with authority on al Qaeda, having been shot down and left for dead by an al Qaeda gunman in a Saudi street. Gardner writes in today's Sunday Telegraph:

'The question now is could or should the West come to an understanding with al-Qaeda ideologues in order to prevent further attacks, or would this simply be seen as surrender and an invitation to further violence?'

'Osama bin Laden offered Europe a truce last year, giving its governments three months to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan. The offer was ignored, but although the idea that you cannot and should not make deals with terrorists is a noble one, it is not always followed in practice. Witness the IRA. There are arguments both for and against trying to negotiate with al-Qaeda, but what Western leaders have largely failed to do until now is to take the trouble to really understand what on earth it is that al-Qaeda actually wants.'

' "They don't like us because they don't like our way of life," said President Bush about al-Qaeda on more than one occasion. That is missing the point; al-Qaeda's leadership has never given a stuff how Americans behave in their own country. What they object to most is the presence of Western forces in Muslim lands. It is true that one of the organisation's early ideological influences was an Egyptian engineer who returned from the US bitter and disgusted at what he saw there as decadent behaviour. But that is not the reason why bin Laden and those who follow him are at war with the West. The US Administration has also sought to depict al-Qaeda as nihilistic madmen with no discernible aims. Again, this is untrue. Al-Qaeda and those that follow it do have aims and grievances but they also have a maddening habit of shifting the goalposts.'

'In the 15 years that I have been watching the al-Qaeda phenomenon I have seen its agenda morph from being a localised, country-specific one into a global war with America and all its allies... '

'The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have rightly pointed out in recent days that al-Qaeda was attacking the West long before the invasions of either Iraq or Afghanistan. But it would be wrong to assume that al-Qaeda's attacks simply came out of nowhere. They stem from a desire both for revenge for perceived injustices and to warn off the West from "interfering" in Muslim countries.'

'The question of whether the West should talk to al-Qaeda is really an academic one. These people do not sit around long tables with bottles of Evian and interpreters. But they have, through smuggled video cassettes and internet broadcasts, and in their own pedantic and lecturing way, made their demands clear. These are: the withdrawal of all Western forces from Muslim lands, especially Iraq, the withdrawal of support for Israel, and of support for "apostate" governments, specifically in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.'

'I am not for one minute suggesting that the West must do al-Qaeda's bidding, but it is easy to see how the first of these demands currently carries most weight amongst al-Qaeda's followers.'

'It is true that there are men at the heart of al-Qaeda who still dream of reviving by force the great mediaeval caliphate, an Islamic empire that once stretched from Andalusia to India. These individuals will probably never be satisfied until the whole world is one giant caliphate but their ideas have little popular appeal on the Muslim street. There are also the smouldering conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya but these are hard to blame on the West. By contrast, the invasion of Iraq and - to a lesser extent - the denial of a viable Palestinian homeland are two burning, emotive issues for many, many Muslims. If these can be resolved then the extremist ideologues risk being left as rebels without a cause. If they are left to fester then al-Qaeda and its associations will never be short of recruits.'

More on the government's repressive proposals tomorrow.

JNV welcomes feedback.