The London Blasts: Media Review

DAY 18: Monday 25 July 2005

Introduction

Defining Denial

INTRODUCTION - 25 JULY

Today's British newspapers are once again dominated by the shooting dead of an innocent Brazilian man by police in the London Underground on Friday. While this is a tragic incident which has stunned the world, and a disaster for the friends and family of Jean Charles de Menezes, it does appear to have been the result of error and confusion, not a deliberate decision to assassinate a suspect rather than arrest him.

For the moment, we will restrict this Review to its central theme, which is the question of how future attacks can be prevented, or at least made less likely. For those visiting for the first time, the background to the comments that follow lie in our priority page, and in our first Media Review. The facts contained in those pages are assumed in what follows.

DENIAL AND REALISM

DEFINING DENIAL - WHITTAM SMITH

In these Media Reviews, we've concentrated on the link between al Qaeda-type terrorism and British foreign policy. We've used the term 'realism' to mean the acceptance that British foreign policy is a major contributory cause of attacks such as the recent London bombings and attempted bombings. We've also used the term 'denial' to mean the opposite.

Andreas Whittam Smith, former editor of the anti-war Independent, has a very sensible column in today's paper (page 29 or paid--for access here) which adopts this usage of the term 'denial'.

Whittam Smith notes Tony Blair's tendency to compare himself favourably with Neville Chamberlain, who famously 'appeased' Hitler in the 1930s. He notes: 'Yet "appeasement" in the 1930s was first cousin to what we call "denial". And if the Prime Minister is in denial about the impact of the Iraq war on terrorism, then his error - as error I believe it is - isn't so very different from Chamberlain's tragic misunderstanding nearly 70 years ago.'

CHAMBERLAIN

Two critical comments are in order here, reflecting on certain aspects of this otherwise valuable article.

Firstly, what was the nature of Chamberlain's "misunderstanding" of Hitler? Chamberlain could see how Hitler was abusing the populations of Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, but he assumed that Nazi oppression would remain directed at central and eastern Europeans, and would not affect Britain itself, or British interests abroad. 'Peace in our time' meant 'peace for Britons and for British interests', not necessarily peace for the peoples of Eastern Europe. Thus the Nazi invasion of Poland led to the paper declaration of war on Germany by France and Britain, but no military action (leading to the accusation of western betrayal).

Chamberlain was not necessarily 'in denial about the nature of the Nazi government', as Andreas Whittam Smith suggests. The British government was well aware of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to divide Poland between them over a week before the invasion. Chamberlain may simply have been mistaken as the extent of Hitler's ambitions, and the direction that Nazi brutality was heading in (beyond Czechosolovakia to Belgium and wider afield). He may just have misjudged the consequences for Britain itself, and for "British interests" (in other words, the interests of the rich and powerful circles who were the primary beneficiaries of the British empire).

Similarly, Tony Blair may not be 'in denial about the nature of the US government' today. But when he signed up to George W. Bush's "Global War on Terror" he may have been mistaken as to the extent of US ambitions, and about the direction the direction that US brutality was heading in (beyond Afghanistan to Iraq and wider afield). Mr Blair may just have misjudged the consequences for Britain itself, and for "British interests" (in other words, the interests of the rich and powerful circles who are the primary beneficiaries of Britain's subsidiary role in the US empire).

Blair is not merely in 'denial' about the foreign policy roots of the terrorism we now face in Britain itself, he is an "appeaser" of and in fact a collaborator in the US foreign policies which are the principal cause of al Qaeda-type terrorism (see the first Media Review).

ERROR AND DOMINATION

Secondly, Whittam Smith speaks of Tony Blair's denial of a link between British foreign policy and the terrorist attacks as 'error': 'if the Prime Minister is in denial about the impact of the Iraq war on terrorism, then his error - as error I believe it is'...

He then suggests that the Prime Minister has made a mistake in invading Iraq: 'My guess is that Mr Blair is saying something like this to himself: "If I admit error, I'm done for; the best way of staying in power is to bluff it out." For consider what confessing that the invasion of Iraq was a colossal mistake would mean for the Prime Minister.'

Here we see a standard element of what Noam Chomsky calls 'feigned dissent'.

Whittam Smith is one of the liberal critics of the war in Iraq, and British foreign policy in general. He connects the war in Iraq with the terror attacks in London. He describes the "war on terror" (in this article) as 'an alliance that routinely practices torture'. He calls on Mr Blair to openly criticise the Guantanamo Bay detention centre.

But there are limits to mainstream dissent. British troops should not be swiftly withdrawn from Iraq: 'The London bombings must not have that consequence.' Criticism of 'the glaring deficiencies in American policy' should be private not public (apart from Guantanamo).

And, most importantly, Whittam Smith assumes that 'what has gone wrong' is due to 'error'. The intention was noble. The execution was flawed.

THE STATE IS GOOD

It is a staple of mainstream propaganda that the intention is always noble, it is always the execution that was flawed (perhaps as a result of the evil of the enemy).

The State is always motivated by a desire for peace, freedom, justice and democracy, even when it launches a war to re-establish Saddam's regime (without Saddam), then hires Saddamist torturers and murderers, tries to rig the elections, backs one of Saddam's former thugs for Prime Minister, and then hobbles elected Iraqi politicians with undemocratic constraints.

Mainstream critics can be savage in their condemnations of any particular policy. But they must have as their starting point the assumption that the motive for that policy is benign. The State Is Good. That is the fundamental principle.

Is the Prime Minister denying the impact of the Iraq war on terrorism because of an intellectual "error"? Whittam Smith himself suggests that the primary reason is political survival - not error, but power-seeking.

Was the war on Iraq launched because of an intellectual "error"? No doubt errors were made in the conception and planning of the war, but at its root this was not a war to make the world safe from Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction - this objective could have been carried out better by the UN weapons inspectors. A strong argument can be made that this was a war for domination.

The way in which the word "error" is used is important. Whittam Smith assumes that this is the only alternative explanation. He only glancingly admits the possibility of conscious deceit (in denying the foreign policy roots of the terrorist attacks). He does not admit at all the possibility that the invasion was motivated by any less-than-noble objectives.

The critiques that mainstream critics offer is not true dissent, but 'feigned dissent', which holds to the fundamentals of the propaganda system. It is a set of critiques that are compatible with the fundamental assumption that the State Is Good, and so are admitted to the domain of respectable opinion.

If we are to find our way out of this crisis, we must be prepared to break out of the confines of the mainstream critique, to practice scepticism towards left-liberal oppositionists as well as to government cheerleaders.

JNV welcomes feedback.