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The London Blasts: Media
Review
DAY
16: Saturday 23 July 2005
Shoot to kill
Other short comments
SHOOT TO KILL
Can it be justified to
shoot
a suspect dead rather than to arrest her or him, as
the Metropolitan Police have done in south London?
The police case appears
to be that from evidence recovered at one of the failed
bombings on Thursday 21 July, they determined that a particular
house was connected with the conspiracy, and that the man
who was shot dead left that house, and could have been a
suicide bomber on his way to carry out another attack. In
these circumstances, shooting him dead was the only way
to prevent him from possibly carrying out such an attack,
given that he failed to halt when called upon to do so.
The Telegraph
seems to have the best account:
At about 10am, police
challenged a man they had trailed from a house close to
the station. They had been keeping the property under surveillance
after documentary evidence was found in one of the defective
bombs the day before.
The man bolted at the challenge and
ran into the station. He was chased by three armed, plain-clothes
officers, with more immediately appearing in support.
The suspect was chased down the escalators
to the Northern line platform and on to a waiting train.
Several witnesses said he was shot
on the floor of the carriage by an officer who fired four
or five rounds to the head. Security experts suggested that
the severity of these tactics meant police were treating
the man as a possible suicide bomber, perhaps wearing a
bomb belt. Forensic tests indicated that he had no explosives.
It is understood that the man shot
by police was not one of the four whose pictures were released.
The Guardian
has a piece on the secret police deployment known as Operation
Kratos (the Telegraph
has details, but does not use the term):
Solicitor
Daniel Machover is quoted as saying 'that
even if the suspect shot dead had no weapons or explosive,
officers could have a defence against a murder charge. Mr
Machover, who has has taken legal actions against police
after shooting incidents, said: "If the perception
in the officers' minds was that the suspect was posing an
immediate threat to them or others, opening fire may well
have been lawful. The test is the threat they perceived
when they opened fire." He said a defence against a
lesser charge would be more complex.
The
Times reports: 'Suspect
shot dead "had no bomb" ', but also reports
that 'The
dead man wore a heavy, padded jacket at odds with the mild
weather.'
For those of us who are
not pacifists, it is hard to resist the argument that taking
one person's life is better than taking the risk that that
person will in that moment kill many more people - if
and only if there is compelling evidence that the
suspect is an active member of a suicide bomb conspiracy.
In the circumstances that
are reported, it seems probable that there was such compelling
evidence.
Moral judgement, as in
the case of the Hiroshima bombing, depends not on what is
discovered later, but on the state of knowledge at the time
the decision is taken. In the case of Hiroshima, President
Truman was advised by his most senior advisers that dropping
the atomic bomb on Japan was not necessary at that point
to try to secure the surrender of the Tokyo government.
Other means had not yet been tried (offering guarantees
concerning the position of the Japanese emperor, for example
- guarantees that were not finally offered until after
Nagasaki).
In the present case, what
was the information available to the police when the use
of lethal force was authorised?
We are told that there
was compelling evidence that the house under surveillance
was involved in the bombing conspiracy. Assuming for the
moment that this was the case, there must have been strong
suspicion attaching to any person coming out of the house.
It has been reported (see above) that this person was challenged
to halt by the police, and instead of surrendering to the
police, ran away and onto an underground train.
At this point, the police
believed him to be part of the conspiracy (on evidence yet
to be revealed, but reportedly strong), suspected that he
might be carrying a bomb (because he was wearing an unseasonably
heavy coat, according to The Times,
and had seconds to decide whether or not he was about to
blow up the carriage, killing yet more people.
In Northern Ireland, the
term 'shoot to kill' was used to refer to the policy of
assassinating rather than arresting suspects. If in the
current circumstances the suspect was not officially challenged
to stop, then there might be grounds for suspecting such
a policy. It seems highly unlikely, however, given the significant
potential political damage involved in shooting a suspect
dead, and the enormous potential intelligence value of a
live suspect in custody.
OTHER SHORT COMMENTS
BOOSTING AL QAEDA
Matthew
Parris has a useful article in The
Times today on the way in which the media, the government,
the security services and al Qaeda itself 'conspire' to
exaggerate the power, efficacy and cunning of al Qaeda.
The power of this "brand" (built up in large part
by the Western media and Western governments) seems, in
fact, to be one reason why one of the major networks of
insurgency in Iraq renamed itself al Qaeda in Iraq.
Jason Burke has written
on the role of the US Government in creating the term (but
not the organization) 'al Qaeda', and on the error of seeing
the loose network as a coherent organisation. Despite arguing
that the term had lost all meaning in January 2003, the
power of the brand meant that his book on the bin Laden
network later that year had to be called, 'Al-Qaeda'.
TELEGRAPH POLL: BRITISH
MUSLIMS
The Telegraph
has a poll
today of British Muslim opinion, which it headlines, 'One
in four Muslims sympathises with motives of terrorists'.
An alternative, equally justified, headline would have been
'Nine out of ten Muslims condemns actions of terrorists'.
What the Telegraph
does not report is what proportion of the non-Muslim population
sympathises with the motives
of the bombers. What we have seen in the Guardian
poll is that two-thirds of the British people believe
that Tony Blair and his foreign policy share some responsibility
for the London bombings. This suggests that non-Muslim opinion
may not be that far different from Muslim opinion on these
critical issues.
Psephologist Anthony
King comments that, 'The sheer scale of Muslim alienation
from British society that the survey reveals is remarkable.'
In evidence he cites the finding that nearly one British
Muslim in five, 18 per cent, feels little loyalty towards
this country or none at all, commenting that 'If these findings
are accurate, and they probably are, well over 100,000 British
Muslims feel no loyalty whatsoever towards this country.'
He does not, however,
quote figures for the proportion of the non-Muslim population
that feels little or no loyalty to Britain.
A poll for the Radio 4
Today programme in 2002 of the general population found
that 16 per cent of respondents either felt 'not very' or
'not at all' patriotic. The corresponding figure for Muslims
was 23 per cent. A significant difference, to be sure, but
not an overwhelming one. Since then, however, much has occurred
to lessen British Muslim's loyalty to this country.
JNV welcomes feedback.
This page last updated 23 July 2005
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