Submission to the Iraq Commission, June 2007

Iraq: Total Withdrawal and the UN Option

JNV

Executive Summary:

In order to comply with the wishes of the Iraqi people, in accordance with the wishes of the British people, the British Government must commit itself to total withdrawal from Iraq. This will require not only the removal of combat troops from patrol, but the withdrawal of all British troops, military bases, air patrols, artillery units and military 'advisors'.

Once a timetable for withdrawal has been announced (to last no longer than one year), it may be possible for the United Nations or another international organisation to play a constructive role in terms of providing some security and in assisting the political transition to an agreed post-Saddam, post-occupation society.

1) The failure of the current model

1.1 The US-led occupation of Iraq is a failure on many counts. The occupation has failed to create a secure and stable society in Iraq; it has failed even to provide the levels of stability and security that obtained during the last, sanctions-ridden years of the Saddam dictatorship. The occupation is a moral and political failure, it is even an organisational failure. (We understand that the terms of reference of the Iraq Commission exclude discussion of the legal failure of the invasion and occupation.)


2) Iraqi opinion

2.1 The paramount value in discussing future British policy in relation to Iraq must be the wishes of the Iraqi people. It is clear that the majority of the Iraqi people wish to see the occupation brought to a rapid - though not necessarily immediate - end.

2.2 The BBC commissioned a poll of 2,000 Iraqis throughout Iraq (between 25 February and 5 March 2007).

2.3 Out of those polled, 31% blamed US-led forces most for the violence in the country (see Table 1). 69% felt that the presence of US forces was making Iraq less rather than more secure. 78% of those polled opposed the presence of 'coalition' troops in Iraq. 51% now believe it is acceptable to attack occupation forces - a dramatic tripling of support for the insurgency since 2004.

Table 1. Who do you blame the most for the violence that is occurring in the country? BBC poll, 25 February-5 March 2007

2.4 In line with previous polls, despite this enormous hostility to the occupation, Iraqis display ambivalence when confronted with the prospect of actual withdrawal. While the proportion favouring immediate withdrawal has risen over the last two years, it is still a distinct minority (35%, see Table 2). There is an equally strong desire (38% of respondents) for US-led troops to remain until security is restored (despite the fact that most Iraqis think US-led troops undermine rather than strengthen security).

Table 2. How long do you think US and other Coalition forces should remain in Iraq? Should they leave now, remain until security is restored, remain until the Iraqi government is stronger, remain until Iraqi security forces can operate independently, remain longer but leave eventually, or never leave? BBC poll, 25 February-5 March 2007

2.4 The likely explanation for this ambivalence is the high level of anti-occupation, criminal and sectarian violence. Answering questions about the biggest problems confronting them personally and the nation as a whole, roughly half the poll respondents identified 'security' as the biggest problem in both categories.

2.5 However, in another poll, this time of 5,019 Iraqi adults throughout Iraq (between 10–22 February 2007), great confidence was expressed about the post-withdrawal situation.

2.6 Only 11 per cent of respondents said things would get 'a great deal worse' in the weeks following the withdrawal of occupation forces. 29% of all respondents said things would get 'a great deal better', and 24 per cent said it would get 'a little better'. In total, 53% were optimistic, while only 26% thought things would get worse.

2.7 These conflicting results are consistent with past surveys. They demonstrate a longing for a rapid end to the occupation, but a confusing mixture of fear and confidence about the post-occupation period.

2.7 A poll of 1,150 Iraqi adults conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland in September 2006 found that 71% of Iraqis wanted US-led forces to leave Iraq within a year. This opinion was held by 91% of (Arab) Sunnis and 74% of Shias (see chart).

Table 3. Which of the following would you like the Iraqi government to ask the US-led forces to do? Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll, September 2006

*Only reduce as the security situation improves

3) British opinion

3.1 The British public opposed the invasion of Iraq, and has opposed the occupation of Iraq, apart from a period of forced acquiescence during the first months of the war, when the need to support British troops on the ground overcame other objections.

3.2 In October 2006, a poll for the Guardian found that public opinion was hardening against Britain's military presence in Iraq. Only 30% supported the Government's position that British troops should be kept in Iraq indefinitely. Almost half of those questioned - 45% - wanted British forces pulled out immediately. A further 16% wanted them to leave by the end of the year.

3.3 Thus a total of 61% of respondents were in favour of unconditional withdrawal, whatever the security or political circumstances in the country, a significant rise from September 2005, when the Guardian found 51% backed troop withdrawal (and 41% believed that British forces should stay in Iraq until the security situation in the country had improved).

3.4 A poll for the Telegraph in October 2006 found a similar level of support for unconditional (though not necessarily immediate withdrawal). 56% of those asked thought that British troops should either be withdrawn immediately (19%) or within a year, whatever the conditions in Iraq (37%).

3.5 The proportion of those in favour of immediate withdrawal was 45% in the Guardian, but only 19% in the Telegraph. The overall level of support for unconditional withdrawal was roughly the same (61% as opposed to 56%), so this seems to indicate some ambivalence in British opinion, a counterpart to the contradictory results in Iraq.

3.6 It seems likely that the cause of this ambivalence is the same, a deeply-held belief that US-UK forces are undermining security in Iraq (41% of British people believe this, according to the Telegraph poll), but a fear that the precipitate withdrawal of these forces might make the situation even worse.


4) Total withdrawal

4.1 Given the sentiments of the Iraqi and British peoples, we must look to some form of British withdrawal from Iraq. What is clear is that the options being presented to the British people within the political mainstream do not represent genuine independence for Iraq. What is referred to as "withdrawal" is simply a reduction in the military and political cost of maintaining Western domination of the resources of Iraq.

4.2 In particular, the focus of attention seems to be the withdrawal of ground troops from regular patrols in Iraq.

4.3 While this is of considerable importance, this does not constitute true military withdrawal.

4.4 If US-UK forces continue to occupy permanent bases in Iraq, on stand-by for special operations; if US-UK aircraft continue to patrol Iraqi airspace, and to carry out surveillance, air support and airstrike operations; if US-UK land-based artillery continue the bombardment of Iraqi cities, towns and villanges; if US-UK vessels in the Persian Gulf continue to use missiles (and possibly artillery) to attack targets inside Iraq; and if US-UK "advisors" continue to train and direct locally-recruited forces, the US-UK war has not come to an end, it has merely changed its mode of operation.

4.5 This continuing military intervention is precisely what was recommended by the December 2006 US Iraq Study Group report, which is thought to closely resemble thinking in Whitehall.

4.6 The Iraq Study Group called for the withdrawal of all ground troops except those 'necessary for force protection' - those who will protect members of the armed services, civilian employees, family members, and military facilities and equipment that remain in Iraq. In addition, US forces would, under the plan, 'assist Iraqi deployed brigades with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics support'. A 'vital mission' would be to maintain 'rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams' for use against insurgents - against al-Qaeda in Iraq, in particular.

4.7 The Financial Times commented in September 2004: 'The core question to be addressed is this: is the continuing presence of US military forces in Iraq part of the solution or part of the problem? As occupying power, the US bears responsibility for Iraq under international law, and is duty-bound to try to leave it in better shape than it found it. But there is no sign of that happening. The time has therefore come to consider whether a structured withdrawal of US and remaining allied troops, in tandem with a workable handover of security to Iraqi forces and a legitimate and inclusive political process, can chart a path out of the current chaos.'

4.8 The FT observed: 'Until eventual withdrawal, there would have to be a policy of military restraint, imposed above all on those US commanders who have operated without reference to their own superiors, let alone the notionally sovereign Iraqi government. [There should also be] an amnesty, which should help Iraqi authorities acquire the legitimacy to crush jihadist and other hold-outs. Ideally, the US would accompany withdrawal by stating it has no intention of establishing bases in Iraq, and instead wishes to facilitate regional security agreements.' (10 September 2004)

4.9 This is a vision for total withdrawal, including the withdrawal of US-UK bases.

4.10 What is required is the total military, political, economic and financial withdrawal of the occupation forces. While there is an overwhelming case for reparations by the occupying powers, it should be channelled through an independent third party rather than providing an opportunity for those who invaded Iraq's territory to use their economic muscle to invade Iraq's economy.

4.11 The UK and US governments claim that they intend to withdraw (ground troops only) under the correct conditions (safety, functioning Iraqi security forces, and so on). They call for "conditions-based" withdrawal, not calendar-based withdrawal.

4.12 There are two problem with this approach, if we assume it is sincere.

4.13 It is not legitimate for the occupying powers to shape Iraq and its security forces, and the evidence demonstrates that it is simply not possible for the occupying powers to shape Iraq and its security forces.

4.14 Safety is not a matter for invaders to establish, and the invaders' presence undermines public safety, as Sir Richard Dannatt said in October 2006. The Chief of the General Staff told the Daily Mail that British troops should 'get ourselves out [of Iraq] sometime soon because our presence exacerbates the security problems.' (Daily Mail, 13 October 2006)

4.15 The case for withdrawing from Iraq 'soon' is overwhelming.

4.16 The case for a total US-UK withdrawal, rather than merely a ground troops withdrawal, is extremely powerful, given Iraqi opinion.

4.17 At the same time, it is also clear that international opinion, including the British public, has a keen interest in the security and well-being of the Iraqi people, and a wish to offer options that, in the context of US-UK withdrawal, may provide the best opportunities for the reduction of violence and fear, and the development of democracy and freedom.


5) The UN Option - The Insurgents' View

5.1 One possible framework for total withdrawal would be a UN security force in Iraq, a force which excluded US or British troops. This might have the opportunity to provide some security while being relatively acceptable to the Iraqi people.

5.2 There are signs from Iraq that such a step would be acceptable. Iraq expert Juan Cole, perhaps the most-widely quoted commentator on Iraq, commented in June 2005: ‘Would the Iraqi government accept a United Nations military mission? Almost certainly. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani [spiritual leader of Iraq's Shia majority] has often attempted to involve the UN, and would welcome such a development. The Sunni Arabs would also much prefer to deal with the UN than with the US.’

5.3 Earlier, there had been signs of support for the UN from the hardline Shia group led by Muqtada al-Sadr. As negotiations broke down before the US onslaught on Najaf in 2004, a spokesperson for Muqtada al-Sadr called for UN troops to replace US troops: 'We prefer the UN to the [US-led] occupation forces, because Iraq is a member of the United Nations,' Sheikh Ahmed al-Shaibani said. 'There is a big difference between the blue helmets [of UN troops] and the occupation troops.'

5.4 Even earlier, in December 2003, US journalist Robert Collier found that support for a UN force was a common thread across the sectarian divide. After interviewing 'dozens of Shiite leaders, Sunni clerics, and Baathists of all levels in Baghdad and the nearby cities of Falluja, Samarra, and Sadr City', Collier found wide agreement on the UN option, including the right-wing Sunni nationalist element of the Iraqi insurgency, formerly members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party.

5.5 Collier wrote: 'Baathists insist that the United Nations is not the enemy, despite the terrorist bombings in August and September [2003] that caused it to flee the country. "If the United Nations is acting by itself, and not just on behalf of the Americans, it will be welcomed," said a former high-ranking Foreign Ministry official. "When I see a blue helmet, it's totally different from seeing an American helmet, even psychologically. If the United Nations took over from the Americans, it would create a new atmosphere." ' (American Prospect, March 2004, or cached here)

5.6 These indications were confirmed dramatically when Time magazine documented negotiations between the US authorities and the Sunni insurgents in 2005: 'Top insurgent field commanders and negotiators informed TIME that the rebels have told diplomats and military officers that they support a secular democracy in Iraq but resent the prospect of a government run by exiles who fled to Iran and the West during Saddam's regime. The insurgents also seek a guaranteed timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal, a demand the U.S. refuses. But there are some hints of compromise: insurgent negotiators have told their U.S. counterparts they would accept a U.N. peacekeeping force as the U.S. troop presence recedes. Insurgent representative Abu Mohammed says the nationalists would even tolerate U.S. bases on Iraqi soil. "We don't mind if the invader becomes a guest," he says, suggesting a situation akin to the U.S. military presence in Germany and Japan.' (Time, 20 February 2005)

5.7 In December 2005, there came more evidence that the UN option had support in the nationalist wing of the Iraqi insurgency. Harith al-Dari, Secretary General of the Association of Muslim Scholars, which is close to the Sunni insurgency, set out a four-part peace proposal, which included a timetable for withdrawing US/UK troops; 'replacing the occupation forces with a UN force whose main task would be to fill the security void'; the formation of an interim Iraqi government and the holding of elections 'under the supervision of the UN'; and then a new Iraqi government taking charge of reconstruction. (Guardian, 15 December 2005)

5.8 While it is not clear exactly what the current state of opinion is within the Sunni and Shia militant groups, one important insight was given by the ceasefire proposal set out by Sunni insurgents in February 2007.

5.9 Rupert Cornwell reported: 'Over the past two years, as the depth and scope of the insurgency grew, reports surfaced of back-channel contacts between US military representatives and the insurgents - including the "1920 Revolution Brigade", a wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement that is behind the latest offer. Details of the talks, never officially confirmed by the US, were sketchy. But insurgent leaders were said to have been willing to accept a United Nations peacekeeping force, as the US forces pulled out. Then as now, however, Washington refused to accept anything resembling a fixed timetable for a pull-out.' (Independent, 9 February 2007)


6) The Replacement Option - Conclusions

6.1 The viability of a replacement option depends on whether there are countries which would carry out this duty, and whether the insurgent forces would permit it to operate.

6.2 The indications are that the replacement of US forces by UN forces would be likely to isolate al-Qaeda, and significantly reduce the level of violence in Iraq, and that the replacement of the US-managed political process with a UN-assisted political process would give Iraq's communities a new opportunity for creating a just and agreed political settlement.

6.3 What is badly needed is a process of dialogue with neutral mediators which can lead to an agreed outcome unprejudiced by outside countries such as the US and UK.

6.4 In this context, if the starting point is a US-UK declaration of total withdrawal, it is quite possible, as Juan Cole has suggested, that countries might be willing to be involved in a UN peacekeeping force on the basis that they would be likely to benefit from Iraq's oil wealth as the country recovered and reconstructed its oil industry and civilian infrastructure.

6.5 The replacement force could be provided by the United Nations, by the Arab League, or perhaps by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Whichever proposal is made (we will refer to a ‘UN force’ for simplicity’s sake), its deployment should be conditional on the consent of the Iraqi people, perhaps through a national referendum organized under UN auspices after the US and UK have announced their intention to totally withdraw from Iraq.

6.6 Maximum political acceptability in Iraq and internationally would come if UN involvement was managed by the UN General Assembly rather than the Security Council, which has been dominated by the US and UK.

6.7 The UN must not be turned into a fig-leaf for US domination, as is currently being mooted. (Guardian, 23 May 2007)

6.8 A genuine UN option must have as its starting point a timetable (lasting no more than one year) for total and unconditional US-UK military, economic and political withdrawal, with aid and reparations channelled through neutral third-parties such as UN agencies.

6.9 A UN replacement force is the logical, moral and legal alternative to endless war, and an essential first step towards a non-military resolution of the conflicts in Iraq.

6.10 If accepted by the Iraqi people, a UN replacement force could meet their expressed needs for independence and security, and satisfy the desire of the British people to end Britain's war in Iraq, while giving the Iraqi people the best possible start to their post-Saddam, post-occupation future.