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Gulf Crisis Weekly
2 May 2012
Divisions in Israel over Iran strike
Milan Rai, Justice Not Vengeance
The end of April saw a flurry of stories
about divisions within the Israeli security establishment over
the government’s attempt to push the idea of a unilateral
strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The stories tended
to confirm JNV’s previous arguments that:
Iran is seeking threshold
status rather than a deployable nuclear weapon;
the Israeli government
is not serious about its threats to attack Iran;
and the British mainstream
media is doing a terrible job of reporting Iran.
Timing
The two big events at the end of April were
highly-critical remarks, in quick succession, from the head of
the Israeli military, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, and from
the former head of Israeli domestic intelligence, Yuval Diskin.
According to the New
York Times, ‘The timing of the critiques of the policy
on Iran was largely coincidental: Mr Gantz spoke during the chief
of staff’s traditional Independence Day round of interviews,
and Mr Diskin, having promised to stay silent for a year after
his retirement, spoke as the anniversary approached.’
Coincidental? Diskin retired on 15 May 2011,
so speaking out on 27 April was several weeks ahead of schedule
(but only three days after Gantz had undermined the case for war).
These interventions are only a part of a
long-running campaign by senior figures in the Israeli security
establishment, desperately trying to avert a fully-fledged war
on Iran. (They all support covert operations, however.)
Gantz speaks
The FT (25
April 2012) summed up Gantz’s contribution: ‘The
head of the Israeli military believes Iran will not build an atomic
bomb, arguing that the leadership in Tehran is “composed
of very rational people”.’
The armed forces chief-of-staff was speaking
to one of Israel’s leading newspapers, Haaretz.
In stark contrast to the apocalyptic tones used by Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Gantz said: ‘Despair
not. We are a temperate state. The State of Israel is the
strongest in the region and will remain so. Decisions can and
must be made carefully, out of historic responsibility but without
hysteria.’ (Emphasis added.)
Gantz also questioned the Prime Minister’s
assertion that 2012 was the year of decision (and therefore of
military action): ‘This is a critical year, but not necessarily
“go, no-go”.’
Most tellingly, Gantz portrayed Iran’s
leadership, and its goals, in quite a different light: Iran ‘is
going step by step to the place where it will be able to decide
whether to manufacture a nuclear bomb. It
hasn’t yet decided whether to go the extra mile.’
(Emphasis added.)
‘If the [Iranian] supreme religious
leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wants, he will advance it to the
acquisition of a nuclear bomb, but the decision must first be
taken. It will happen if Khamenei judges that he is invulnerable
to a response. I believe he would be making an enormous mistake,
and I don’t think he will want to go the extra mile. I
think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people.’
Shannon Kile, a nuclear proliferation expert
at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said
Gantz’s description of Iranian leaders as rational was ‘quite
an interesting turnabout’.
(Reuters,
25 April 2012)
It might be more accurate to say that seeing
the Iranian leadership as not simply rational but ‘very
rational’ is a massive disruption to Western propaganda
about the Islamic Rebublic. Coming from Israel’s most senior
military official, it is particularly striking.
The Japan Option
Gantz therefore falls in with the near-consensus
of informed observers, that Iran is seeking not a nuclear weapon,
but the capability to build a nuclear weapon. This is sometimes
referred to as the ‘Japan option’.
Japan is the world’s largest holder
of weapons-grade plutonium; its stock may exceed the quantity
in the US nuclear arsenal by 2020. Currently it has around 30
tons of plutonium stockpiled. Most is on loan to other countries;
the 25% held on Japanese soil could be turned into over 1,000
nuclear bombs. Japan has the technical expertise and equipment
quickly to weaponise its nuclear materials if it so chose. Thus,
to take the ‘Japan option’ is to be on the threshold
of nuclear weapon status, without crossing it. (For background,
see Dr
Frank Barnaby and Shaun Burnie, Thinking the Unthinkable: Japanese
nuclear power and proliferation in East Asia, Oxford Research
Group, 2005)
The RAND quasi-governmental research group
in the US issued a report on this topic in 2011 which concluded:
‘Iran is likely in the near to medium term to strive to
stay within the bounds of international norms and laws established
by the NPT while continuing with uranium enrichment and warhead
experimentation.’ The report ‘Iran’s
Nuclear Future’, compiled for the US Air Force, cited
a statement by Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani that Iran
was seeking a nuclear capability like that of Japan, which has
‘nuclear technology but does not possess any nuclear weapons’.
(“Iran’s Nuclear Program Will Follow Japanese Model:
Larijani,” Mehr News Agency, February 25, 2010, cited on
p14 of the
RAND report.)
The most important and authoritative examples
of this assessment are the 2007
and 2011
US National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the consensus reports
of the entire US intelligence community, which both concluded
that Iran halted any work on nuclear weaponization in 2003, and
there was no evidence of any decision or any moves to build a
nuclear weapon since that time. According to Seymour
Hersh, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) tried to get
the 2011 NIE to say that Iran’s earlier nuclear-weapons
research was focused on Iraq, not Israel, the US or Western Europe.
The DIA believes that Iran feared that Iraq had a nuclear weapons
programme, and took steps towards deterrence, calling it off once
the 2003 war terminated that fear. The arguments over this analysis,
which would undermine any war fever, apparently delayed the 2011
NIE for four months.
Getting back to the Japan option, US Defence
Secretary Leon Panetta was unusually candid on the subject on
US television in January: ‘Are they [Iran] trying to
develop a nuclear weapon? No. But we know that they’re trying
to develop a nuclear capability, and that’s what concerns
us.’
There is a slightly different attitude in
parts of Europe: ‘If you’re asking whether we would
be satisfied with Iran becoming Japan, then the answer is a qualified
yes,’ a senior European diplomat told the New York Times
(24
January 2012). ‘But it would have to be verifiable,
and we are a long ways away from trusting the regime.’
It is often asserted that being a ‘threshold
state’ like Japan is somehow in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. This is not so, as pointed out by Richard Dalton, former
British ambassador to Iran, and five other former European ambassadors
to the Islamic Republic: ‘Most experts, even in Israel,
view Iran as striving to become a “threshold country”,
technically able to produce a nuclear weapon but abstaining from
doing so for now. Again, nothing in international law forbids
this ambition.’ (Guardian,
9 June 2011)
Other Gantz remarks
It may be worth noting that General Gantz
made some other interesting remarks during his ‘traditional
Independence Day round of interviews’. To Haaretz,
he said: ‘I agree that such a [nuclear] capability, in the
hands of Islamic fundamentalists who at particular moments could
make different calculations, is dangerous.’
To Yediot Ahronot, the chief of staff said
he had ordered his forces to step up covert operations in enemy
countries. ‘You almost won’t find a point in time
where something isn’t happening somewhere in the world,’
he said. ‘I am escalating all those special operations.’
He didn’t name any countries, but Iran is an obvious candidate.
(AP,
22 April 2012)
Diskin
The Gantz controversy was followed rapidly
by outspoken comments by the former head of Shin Bet, Israel’s
equivalent of the FBI. There have been different views expressed
about how Yuval Diskin left office. Ronen Bergman, Israeli author
of The
Secret War With Iran, said that Diskin’s words
carried weight because he left the government in good standing
with Prime Minister Netanyahu and because he was widely respected
‘for being professional and honest and completely disconnected
from politics.’ (NYT,
28 April 2012)
Apologists for Netanyahu have tried to smear
Diskin, saying he was bitter after being passed over for leadership
of Mossad, the Israeli equivalent of the CIA, and that he is positioning
himself for entry into party politics. Both of these slurs lack
weight. As Associated Press noted,
‘In Israel, security figures carry clout well into retirement.
Although they frequently pursue political careers, Diskin had
been seen as relatively apolitical, perhaps lending his words
even greater weight.’
Diskin told the Majdi Forum, a residents’
group in the Israeli city of Kfar Sava:
‘My major problem is that I have
no faith in the current leadership, which must lead us in an
event on the scale of war with Iran or a regional war.... I
don’t believe in a leadership that makes decisions based
on messianic feelings.... Believe me, I have observed them from
up close.... They are not people who I, on a personal level,
trust to lead Israel to an event on that scale and carry it
off. These are not people who I would want to have holding the
wheel [driving the car] in such an event.’
(Haaretz,
28 April 2012)
AP reported Diskin as saying: ‘They
are not messiahs, these two.’ (AP,
28 April 2012)
Diskin added: ‘They are misleading
the public on the Iran issue. They tell the public that if Israel
acts, Iran won’t have a nuclear bomb. This is misleading.
Actually, many experts say that an Israeli attack would accelerate
the Iranian nuclear race.’ (Haaretz,
28 April 2012)
Other Diskin remarks
Iran wasn’t the only topic the former
spy chief spoke out on. The New York Times reported:
‘Many here saw Mr. Diskin’s
comments on the government’s dealings with the Palestinians,
which was in his direct purview, as even more significant than
those on Iran. While Mr. Netanyahu has insisted that the peace
process is stalled because he does not have a willing partner,
Mr. Diskin declared: “This
government has no interest in talking with the Palestinians,
period. It certainly has no interest in resolving anything
with the Palestinians, period.”’ (NYT,
28 April 2012, emphasis added.)
Regarding relations between Israeli Jews
and other groups, Diskin said: ‘Over the past 10-15 years,
Israel has become more and more racist. All of the studies point
to this. This is racism toward Arabs and toward foreigners, and
we are also become a more belligerent society.’
(Haaretz,
28 April 2012)
Messianic
The repeated references to the ‘messianic’
nature of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak
are particularly interesting given Netanyahu’s own use of
the concept in relation to Iran.
In 2009, Netanyahu described the Iranian
leadership thus:
‘You don’t want a messianic
apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed
believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of
mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and
that is what is happening in Iran.’ (Atlantic,
March 2009)
Diskin, saying that he had observed Barak
and Netanyahu up close, labelled
them ‘two messianics – the one from Akirov or
the Assuta project and the other from Gaza Street or Caesarea,’
referring to their places of residence.
Dagan
A few British media outlets noticed that
these were not isolated outbursts, but part of a larger wave of
criticisms by Israeli intelligence and military figures.
Reporting the Diskin controversy, the BBC
noted:
‘In March, the former head of Israel's
foreign intelligence service, Mossad, publicly opposed military
action against Iran. Meir Dagan said an Israeli attack would
have “devastating” consequences for the Jewish state
and would not prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.’
(BBC,
28 April 2012)
True, but not the whole story.
The Guardian (28
April 2012) was better, giving this last sentence to its Diskin
story: ‘Diskin's comments also put him in agreement with
the former head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, who has said that attacking
Iran was “the stupidest
thing I have ever heard” and that the Iranian regime
was rational.’ (Emphasis added.)
AP noted Dagan’s earlier opposition:
‘One of the first criticisms voiced
by a security figure came last summer from Israel's recently
retired spy chief, Meir Dagan. He called a strike against Iran's
nuclear program "stupid." Dagan, who headed the Mossad
spy agency, said an effective attack on Iran would be difficult
because Iranian nuclear facilities are scattered and mobile,
and warned it could trigger war.’ (AP,
28 April 2012)
None of these reports gives an accurate sense
of what Dagan has been doing. Well-informed commentator Amos Harel
has remarked: ‘Since the end of his term as the head of
the Mossad last January, Dagan seems to be on a divine mission
to stop the bombing’ of Iran. (Haaretz,
28 April 2012)
It was in his very first public appearance
since leaving Mossad, back in May 2011, that Dagan described the
possibility of an Israeli Air Force attack on Iranian nuclear
facilities as ‘the stupidest thing I have ever heard.’
Dagan also said, in words that have not received
as much attention, that attacking Iran’s legitimate nuclear
power infrastructure, which is under supervision by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, would be ‘patently illegal under international
law’. (Haaretz,
7 May 2011)
In March 2012, Dagan told US television:
‘The regime in Iran is a very rational regime’, describing
the Iranians as ‘masters at negotiation’. Asked whether
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was rational, Dagan said:
‘The answer is yes. Not exactly our rational, but I think
that he is rational.’ (‘The
Spymaster Speaks’, 60 Minutes, CBS, 11 March 2012)
Other figures
There are others in the Israeli security
establishment who have spoken publicly. In March, Dan Halutz,
who led the Israeli military from 2005 to 2007, criticized Netanyahu
for invoking Holocaust imagery in describing the threat posed
by a nuclear-armed Iran. ‘We are not kings of the world,’
Halutz said. ‘We should remember who we are.’ (AP,
28 April 2012)
The Washington Post noted: ‘Although
striking in its bluntness, Gantz’s assessment of Iran’s
nuclear intentions did not differ dramatically from comments made
publicly and privately by other current and former Israeli officials
in recent months.’ The Post quoted Amir Oren, a veteran
military analyst for Haaretz: ‘Many Israelis get the impression
that Netanyahu itches for a fight. The military does not. The
military must weigh the consequences.’ (Washington
Post, 25 April 2012)
The Financial Times found an Israeli official
who spoke off the record: ‘The military and defence establishment
has always been more cautious on the issue of Iran. They are not
minimising the Iranian threat but they are approaching it in a
less catastrophist tone than the political leadership.’
(FT,
25 April 2012)
In the UK, the newspaper of the British armed
forces observed: ‘Gen Gantz’s assessment of Iran's
intentions is consistent with the view of British and American
officials. They also believe that Iran wants the ability to build
a nuclear weapon – in breach of its obligations under the
non-proliferation treaty – but has not yet decided whether
to exercise the option.’ (Telegraph,
25 April 2012)
Manipulation
We’ve argued previously that Israeli
threats (actually, the threats come only from Netanyahu and Barak)
are bluffs, designed not to pave the way for imminent air strikes,
but as a means of exerting political pressure on the US and other
great powers, forcing them into greater efforts against the Iranian
government, through sanctions and covert military operations.
In the reporting of the Gantz and Diskin
interventions, traces of this reality can be discerned.
Talking of the Netanyahu threats, Israeli
analyst Yossi Melman said: ‘In a way, it is paying off:
they achieved the awakening of the international community and
the involvement of the United States.’ He added: ‘It’s
difficult to sense whether it’s manipulation, or part of
it is psychological warfare. I think he really genuinely believes
in what he says.’ (NYT,
30 April 2012)
David Horovitz, a veteran Israeli journalist,
said many Israelis view the strident tone as a ‘successful
effort to create the sense in the international community that
there needs to be more dramatic action in a nonmilitary sense.’
Given the success, ‘I don’t think what’s unfolding
[in terms of international pressure on Iran] is deemed by Netanyahu
and Barak to justify, “OK, we can tone down the process”...
Quite the reverse.’ (NYT,
30 April 2012)
An Israeli minister added weight to this
analysis. Speaking publicly in New York, Israeli Environment Minister
Gilad Erdan criticized Yuval Diskin’s remarks cited above,
saying:
‘The former heads of the security
system should not harm the government's efforts to destroy the
Iranian threat. It is inconceivable that as the Prime Minister
succeeds in putting together an international campaign to raise
awareness about the Iranian threat and increase sanctions against
it, all these former officials come out and hurt Israeli efforts
to recruit the world against Iran by talking about what Israel
can or cannot do.’ (Israel
National News, 30 April 2012)
Note that Erdan points to the success in
putting together an international campaign isolating and escalating
sanctions against Iran, not in laying the basis for a military
strike.
A clearer statement of this kind of position
is set out in a wire service news story:
‘Further complicating the picture
is the widely held suspicion that Israel’s threats may
actually amount to a bluff of historic proportion which has
if anything been effective in compelling the world to boycott
Iranian oil and isolate its central bank. From that perspective,
criticism such as Diskin’s, based on a literal approach,
could be construed as simplistic and self-defeating.’
(AP,
28 April 2012)
Elections
Note that it is generally believed that Israel
is about to see elections announced for later this year. ‘The
minute we have a date set for elections, you have to assume that
Bibi [Netanyahu] and Barak are not going to risk their electoral
chances by taking some dramatic military initiative which could
go wrong,’ said Yossi Alpher, an Israeli strategic analyst.
(NYT,
30 April 2012) Just as the November US elections rule out
a US military strike on Iran this year.
Media coverage
How well did the British media report the
Diskin and Gantz stories? Pretty badly.
In the Guardian, on 28 April, Harriet
Sherwood had a professional report of the two latest interventions,
and quoted Dagan in the last sentence, as already noted. However,
there is no sense of the three men being part of a larger wave
of concern in Israel security circles, and no hint of the manipulation
thesis.
A web search of the Independent’s website
shows a story on Gantz on 26
April 2012, and a one para note on Diskin on Sunday 29
April 2012. A search brings no mention of Dagan in last 30
days. Again, no mention of the manipulation thesis.
The Telegraph website also has no mention
of Dagan in last 30 days, and only mentions Diskin to rubbish
him (Con
Coughlin performing his usual services to the Israeli government
on 30 April 2012). Gantz, however, is accorded a respectful report
of his views, and due note is made of the wider support for his
views among the Israeli military. (Telegraph,
25 April 2012)
A search on The Times website finds no mention
of Gantz or Diskin in the last 30 days. Dagan did scrape a mention
within the last month. He is mentioned in a 4
April article on the possible scale of Israeli casualties
in the event of what The Times describes as a ‘three-week
missile war’ with Iran. Dagan is quoted as warning that
‘an Israeli attack could trigger a regional war lasting
far longer than three weeks.’
Actually, Dagan has said: ‘The Iranians
have the capability to fire rockets at Israel for
a period of months, and Hizbollah could fire tens of thousands
of grad rockets and hundreds of long-range missiles’. (Haaretz,
7 May 2011, emphasis added)
The Times does not see fit to mention Dagan’s
description of a missile war with Iran as ‘the stupidest
thing I have ever heard’.
Uploaded 2 May 2012
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