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Afghanistan: 'Energizing' The Opposition
JNV Anti-War Briefing 91
13 July 2006
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MINISTER:
WE"VE 'ENERGIZED' THE ARMED OPPOSITION
British Defence Secretary Des Browne concedes: 'the very act of
[British troop] deployment into the south [of Afghanistan] has
energised opposition, and the scale of that opposition and the
nature of that opposition became apparent when we were deploying.'
(Guardian, 8 July 2006)
'Coalition reports now refer to the enemy
as "anti-coalition militants" or "ACM", rather
than "al-Qaeda/Taliban" or "AQT" '. (Observer,
9 July 2006) A wide range of social forces has been 'energized'
by the deployment of 3,150 British troops to Helmand province
that started this spring. (BBC,
1 May 2006) The media refer to them all as 'Taliban'.
MORE BRITISH
TROOPS GO IN
'Britain's beleaguered troops in southern Afghanistan are to be
heavily reinforced after a request from defence chiefs... Military
commanders put in a formal request for extra support last Thursday
after British forces in Helmand, Afghanistan's main opium poppy-growing
area, and one of the country's most lawless provinces, came under
sustained attack from resurgent Taliban [sic] forces'. (Independent
on Sunday, 9 July 2006, p. 36)
'An extra 850 troops will be deployed to
Helmand province, where six British soldiers have been killed
in less than a month.' (Guardian, 11 July, p. 1) 'However, only
about 300 [of the newly deployed soldiers] are combat troops.
The rest are engineers and support personnel.' (Times, 11 July,
p. 6) 'Some 450 reservists are to be called up' for the new deployment.
(FT, 11 July, p. 5) 'Currently there are only some 600 British
combat troops in Helmand, one of the world centres of heroin production
which has few good roads and is almost as big as Scotland.' (Telegraph,
7 July 2006) This will increase to around 900.
'Military commanders appear to have been
surprised by the ferocity and number of Taliban fighters. (Guardian,
7 July 2006) A senior British commander, speaking on condition
of anonymity, said 'the Taliban' [sic] had been 'more virulent
than expected'. (Guardian, 11 July, p. 1)
SOFTLY, SOFTLY?
Before the British deployment: 'The British [were] keen to stress
a difference in style from the departing American contingent,
which is due to leave in mid-April. Whereas US soldiers roar through
Laskhar Gah inside armoured vehicles, the British have started
daily foot patrols in an effort to gain people's confidence. On
Thursday [23 February 2006] Drummer Philip Grundy, 21, balanced
his S-80 rifle as he kicked a ball with a group of children. "Pashto?
Ah, me no Pashto," he said, smiling over a cacophony of greetings...
British troops will avoid "busting down doors" or other
search techniques used by US soldiers that have caused anger in
the conservative south. "That's their way but it's not ours,"
said Col Worsley... [But] Many disillusioned Helmandis doubt the
British are serious, said Sardar Muhammad of the Mercy Corps aid
agency. "They think this is a change in name, nothing more,"
he said.' (Guardian)
HELMAND PROVINCE
The reality of intervention has been a shock. 'The men of 16 Air
Assault Brigade, lead [sic] by 6 Para, have fought some astonishing
battles in the past month and have possibly already equalled the
amount of combat experience by colleagues in the Falklands campaign[!]
... The British force of 4,500 [in Helmand] in southern Afghanistan
replaces the 100 US troops based in Lashkar Gah who were clearly
ill-equipped to take on the Taliban. They entered an intelligence
vacuum and senior officers admitted that intelligence had underestimated
the force in the "ungovernable space" that the British
force entered.' (Telegraph, 11 July, p. 4)
A 'senior Foreign Office official', speaking
anonymously, said Britain's objectives 'could not be achieved
"without tackling the problems of southern Afghanistan, the
centre of Taliban country and a heartland of the drugs trade which
has been left to its own devices since 2001".' (Guardian,
11 July, p. 2)
'The southern third of the country, which
British troops are supposed to 'secure for development, has long
been ungovernable and a no-go area for aid agencies. It is all
too easy here for the Taliban to tell local people that the West
- and the pro-western government in Kabul - promised aid but has
done nothing for them... There are few even among the most on-message
British senior officers who do not privately concede that the
mission in Helmand is two years too late. Not only has the distraction
of the war in Iraq allowed the Taliban to regroup, but the British
forces are telling locals that they have come to help the Afghan
government when the credibility of the Karzai administration is
at an all-time low.' (Sunday Times, 9 July, News Review, p. 2)
'CAMP INCOMING'
In the first five weeks of British troops being deployed to an
outpost above the town of Tangye in northern Helmand, 'there have
been only seven days in which the tiny Operational, Mentoring
and Liaison Team has not seen action': ' "We call it 'Camp
Incoming' because we get so many mortars and rounds coming in,"
said Sergeant-Major Brennan with a chuckle. "It is my third
tour in Afghanistan and I have never seen anything like this,"
said Sergeant Mooney. "It's a mega-hot spot," added
Lance Corporal Andy Reid, 26, a medic.' (Times, 7 July 2006, p.
35)
The Times adds, tellingly: 'The team was
supposed to be on a training mission in a peaceful part of Afghanistan,
not a combat zone.'
Elsewhere in Helmand, the British have bases
in Sangin and Gereshk. 'A military source described the whole
area as "Taleban central" and said all the British bases
were under daily attack.' (Times, 6 July, p. 2)
5 July marked the end of the first week of
the full-strength deployment of 3,150 troops to Helmand: 'It has
been a baptism of fire', remarked the Guardian: In Sangin, the
police compound that 150 British paratroopers have been based
in had been attacked six of the seven nights. Three soldiers had
been killed. 'Every night rockets, machinegun fire and AK-47 rounds
thud into walls of sandbags and pepper the police headquarters...
Three weeks ago, officers worried about "hearts and minds"
and made plans for a new bridge across the river that snakes behind
their base. Now they are just focused on staying alive.' (6 July,
pp. 1/2)
THE AFGHAN 'ALLIES'
'One British soldier told how his unit had come under intense
fire from the Afghan police, who are supposed to be their allies.
"They fired and manoeuvred straight past our vehicle,"
said the soldier, from the Parachute Regiment Pathfinder Unit.
"They could clearly see that we weren't the Taliban, but
they still kept firing, and we have intelligence that they had
Taliban fighters with them." The gun battle lasted two hours,
and the British had to abandon a vehicle. British troops are now
so dubious about the Afghan police in the town of Gereshk that
they are given no advance warning of joint patrols, for fear that
they will tip off the Taliban... Nor does the Afghan Army inspire
much more confidence. When the first unit was dispatched south
to work with British troops, a quarter disappeared in transit
from their training camp in Kabul.' (Independent on Sunday, 9
July, p. 37)
'The Karzai government is... allowing local
Afghan commanders to re-create militias, even though it was popular
anger over child abductions and extortion by these private armies
that first led to the emergence of the Taliban a decade ago...
To British dismay, one of those forming a militia [with Karzai's
approval] is Sher Akhundzada, the former governor of Helmand,
who was forced out by the British because of his alleged links
with the drugs mafia.' 'Failure to deal with the warlords has
been one of the biggest criticisms of the Karzai administration...
"I will not tolerate warlords," insisted the new president
to me in 2002... Yet they have found themselves named as ministers,
governors and police chiefs... while [NATO forces] regard the
warlords as part of the problem, the Americans have seen them
as the best source of local intelligence and paid them millions
of dollars.' (Sunday Times, 9 July, News Review, p. 2) In fact,
the 2001 war was won using these forces.
'An estimated one-third of the [Afghan] male
MPs are warlords, gross violators of human rights or drug smugglers;
but, as Karzai says, "better to have them inside rather than
outside doing damage".' (Sunday Times, 9 July, NR, p. 2)
Some people 'outside' Kabul may be feeling 'damaged' by warlords.
They don't count.
FIGHTING
FOR A FUTURE
The fighting is motivated in part by nationalism and history,
in part by religious sentiment, in part by economic desperation
centred on heroin production. 'The United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime estimates that Afghanistan earned $2.8 billion from
opium production last year - more than it received in aid. Given
the international community's failure to create any alternative
economy, it is not surprising that the people of Helmand, who
depend on the poppy and grow a quarter of the country's total,
will fight to safeguard their income.' (Sunday Times, 9 July 2006,
News Review, p. 2)
POURING ON
THE FUEL
The Independent on Sunday supports the British occupation: 'It
is in the world's interest that Afghanistan does not again become
a base for jihadist terrorism.' (9 July, p. 31) Conservative MP
Sir Peter Tapsell provides a rejoinder: 'Sending British troops
into Afghanistan is like throwing kerosene on to a burning tent.
The more troops we send the higher and fiercer the flames will
burn in Afghanistan, throughout the Islamic world and in the streets
of this country.' (Times, 11 July, p. 7) We are 'energizing' the
flames.
Back in April, the previous Defence Secretary
said: 'We would be perfectly happy to leave [Afghanistan] in three
years and without firing one shot because our job is to protect
the reconstruction.' (BBC,
24 April)
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