THE
IAEA vs IRAN
UN Inspectors Harden Their Attitude Towards Iran
JNV Anti-War Briefing 122
3 April 2010 |
This briefing
is available as a pdf.
Posted 3 April
2010 |
THE NEW
IAEA LEADERSHIP VS IRAN
There is a widespread perception that the
new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
tilted the UN agency decisively against Iran in the standoff over
the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities.
The primary evidence against Yukiya Amano,
Director-General
since 1 December 2009, is the latest (18 February) IAEA
report on Iran. (All IAEA Board reports on Iran are available
from the IAEA
website.)
There’s widespread agreement that
the new IAEA report is strikingly different in tone and language
to previous reports. The BBC described it as ‘blunt’
and ‘unusually forthright’; the Washington
Post
said the IAEA report was ‘unusually frank in scolding
Iran’. The Guardian
observed (also on 19 Feb.): ‘The wording goes much further
than reports by Amano’s predecessor Mohamed ElBaradei, who
refrained from explicitly spelling out the implications of evidence
on weapons-building his inspectors had gathered.’
According to one observer quoted by the Guardian,
the report reflected the views of inspectors in the IAEA who felt
that the agency should be more forthright: ‘This is the
safeguards department unleashed’.
The New
York Times quoted two highly-placed government sources:
‘Mr. Amano’s attitude toward Iran is being closely
watched; some officials were concerned that he would be unwilling
to confront the Iranians directly in his first months in office.
But as one American official said Thursday, “It’s
been clear to us that he recognizes the severity of what’s
going on.” ... A European diplomat who works with the nuclear
agency praised the report as tough and more tightly written than
some of the more equivocal assessments of the past, under the
direction of Mohamed ElBaradei.’ (19 Feb.)
The Independent
commented: ‘Under Mr Amano’s predecessor at the IAEA,
Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency was seen as downplaying worries
that Iran was using the cover of civilian nuclear development
to conceal much more dangerous goals. Mr ElBaradei, for a long
time regarded with some suspicion by Washington and other western
capitals, has since expressed an interest in running to be the
President of Egypt.’ (19 Feb.)
CONTINUITY?
The editors of The
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists thought this topic important
enough to justify an extra
comment, in addition to their editorial on the distortion
of the IAEA report by the media (see JNV
Briefing 121). They write: ‘Because of [sic] there is
a large element of subjectivity, arguments about tone are difficult
to defend and put us in the realm of literary analysis. However,
we do not believe that the February report had a jarring difference
in tone, especially when compared to ElBaradei’s more detailed
reports of 2008.’ (Federation of American Scientists Strategic
Studies Blog, 22 Mar.)
Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich make the
reasonable proposal: ‘We invite you to lay out the latest
report next to other IAEA reports, especially those from 2008,
and consider differences in tone.’
THE “ALLEGED STUDIES”
The key differences in tone concern nuclear
proliferation-related documents said to have been found on an
Iranian
government laptop by a foreign intelligence agency—and
provided to the IAEA. While Iran has made several attempts to
deal with these apparently damning documents, the IAEA continues
to have concerns, partly because, since May 2008, Iran has refused
to provide the access to documents and individuals that the IAEA
believes is necessary to resolve the matter.
Some parts of the new report hark back to
the ElBaradei period. For example para. 41 of the February
report, which says there is ‘extensive’ ‘consistent
and credible’ information ‘collected from a variety
of sources’, is almost identical to para. 19 of the IAEA
report of 28 August 2009.
However, other aspects are quite clearly
different. There is a distinct shift hardening of the language
used.
In the four reports of 2008, a total of
six ‘hard’ phrases were used: ‘possible military
dimensions’ (5) and ‘studies’ (as opposed to
‘alleged studies’) (1). In the Feb.
2010 report, twice as many ‘hard’ phrases are
used as in the whole of 2008, including three mentions of ‘possible
military dimensions’ and one unqualified reference to ‘military
related dimensions’ (the final words of the section on this
topic).
During 2008, there were an average of 12
references in each IAEA report to the ‘alleged studies’
or the ‘allegations’. In the Amano report, there are
three. Instead, there are five blunt references to ‘activities’
(not ‘studies’) and an additional two references to
‘undeclared’ or ‘undisclosed’ activities.
The most powerful phrase in the 2010 report
is the reference to Iran’s possible ‘development of
a nuclear payload for a missile’. The
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists editors commented:
‘No matter the context, the phrase “nuclear payload
for a missile”, which was absent from previous reports and
which the media have widely cited, will always sound disconcerting.’
When one includes the use of softer phrases
such as ‘issues’, ‘information’ and ‘documentation’
to refer to the matters under suspicion, we find the ratio of
‘soft’ to ‘hard’ language during 2008
was 6 hard phrases to 96 soft: about 6% hard. In 2010, the ratio
was 50:50, with 12 hard and 12 soft phrases.
OMINOUS OMISSIONS
When we undertake the comparison they suggest,
it is difficult to agree with the Bulletin
editors that ‘any change in tone [in IAEA reports] is largely
imagined’. Furthermore, there are elements of the ElBaradei
reports that are missing from the 2010 report.
The most important difference between 2008
and 2010 is the missing caveat. Every single report in 2008 contained
an emphatic finding along these lines: ‘It should be noted
that the Agency currently has no information—apart from
the uranium metal document—on the actual design or manufacture
by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or
of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related
nuclear physics studies.... It should be emphasised... that the
Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in
connection with the alleged studies.’ (May
2008 IAEA report, paras. 24, 28; see also Feb.,
para. 54; Sept.,
para. 21; Nov.
paras., 24, 28)
There is no such statement in the 2010 report
(and at the same time no indication that this kind of evidence
has recently been discovered).
One problem Iran has cited in dealing with
the accusations against it has been the refusal of Western and
Israeli intelligence agencies to allow the IAEA to give Iran full
access to the allegedly incriminating documents they have provided
to the agency. The problem was noted in a May
2008 IAEA report (paras. 16, 21) and a call issued in Feb.
2009: ‘The Director General, at the same time, urges
Member States which have provided such documentation to the Agency
to agree to the Agency’s providing copies thereof to Iran.’
(para. 21) This call was repeated in June
2009, (para. 23) and as late as November
2009 (para. 32).
No such call is made in the Feb.
2010 report.
CURRENT CONCERNS?
The Feb.
2010 report expresses concern ‘about the possible existence
in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the
development of a nuclear payload for a missile.’ The IAEA
also expresses the desire to clarify its concerns ‘about
these activities and those described above, which seem to have
continued beyond 2004.’ (paras. 41, 43)
A mainstream US
foreign policy think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, commented:
‘This report represents a marked shift in tone from previous
reports, and for the first time the IAEA has raised concerns over
the possibility of current work on a weapons program rather than
simply the possibility of past efforts.’ (22 Feb.)
This part of the
report reflects a secret appendix to the Aug. 2009 IAEA report
on Iran. According to the AP press agency, this secret annexe
suggested that Iranian scientists had engaged in ‘probable
testing’ of explosives arranged in a hemisphere (as with
an implosion-type nuclear warhead), and had worked on a chamber
to carry a warhead on top of one of its missiles ‘that is
quite likely to be nuclear’. (Guardian,
18 Sept. 2009)
However, the evidence
to support these assertions has not been produced, or even hinted
at. Hence the conclusion
of the editors of The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists: ‘the
report adds nothing new.... no new information has been revealed....
the report doesn’t contain any evidence that the public
hasn’t already seen.’
All that is new
is a harder tone from the new IAEA Director-General.
JNV
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