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15
January 2003
60-40
War
Is Not Inevitable, Says Straw (And Blair!)
WAR
PLAN IRAQ Update Number 6
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STRAW LAYS THE ODDS
'Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary,
suggested in London that the chance of a strike against Iraq had
fallen to 60-40 against. He would not explain his calculation,
but said: "That is a reasonably accurate description, but
the situation changes from day to day." ' (Independent,
7 Jan. 2003, p. 2) British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon rebuked
his Cabinet colleague the following day, 'I don't believe it helps
to make this kind of comment at this stage.' (Mirror, 8
Jan., p. 7) This lead to a media furore over suspected splits
within the Cabinet over British policy towards Iraq.
There is indeed a split within the
Cabinet (as discussed below), but 'Speculation that [Mr Straw's]
statement was a monumental career-ending slip proved wrong—the
briefing had been authorised by Number 10. Downing Street, acutely
aware that the formal announcement of military deployments would
increase internal concern that war with Iraq is inevitable, had
constructed a three-pronged strategy to calm domestic fears.'
(Sunday Telegraph, 12 Jan., p. 18)
The three prongs were Mr Straw's (initially
off-the-record) remarks on 4 Jan., followed by a speech by Tony
Blair rebuking the US on 7 Jan. (others will listen to the US,
but the US must 'listen back'—FT, 8 Jan., p. 1), followed
by the Blair-organised 'peace conference' on Middle East the following
week.
CONTINUING DIVISIONS
The three-pronged strategy had not
been communicated to Mr Hoon, and once he'd been informed, the
Defence Secretary 'was on the telephone to Mr Straw to apologise
before you can say, "Jack might succeed Tony, you never know".'
(Sunday Telegraph, 12 Jan., p. 21) 'Yet there remains irritation
within the Ministry of Defence at Mr Straw's "deeply ill-advised"
briefing of the press. One senior figure described it as "clearly
rubbish". "How anyone with a passing acquaintance to
current thinking in Washington could think those are the odds
is a mystery," he said this weekend.' (Sunday Telegraph,
12 Jan., p. 19) From the hawks' point of view, the question is:
'Why release the pressure on Saddam Hussein just as the deployment
of forces is supposed to make clear the allies' readiness to use
force?' (Diplomatic Editor Anton La Guardia, Telegraph,
7 Jan., p. 11)
DOWNING STREET FEARS THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT
Why the complicated strategy? Because
Downing Street is afraid—afraid of the British people and
their growing opposition to another war on Iraq. Telegraph
correspondent Matthew d'Ancona: 'As it has been explained
to me, the purpose of this statement of odds is to convince people
that nothing is decided over Iraq, and nothing is inevitable.'
(Sunday Telegraph, 12 Jan., p. 21)
THE LOOMING CABINET REVOLT
The problems reach into the Cabinet
itself. 'Whitehall is awash with speculation about ministerial
resignations, at junior rather than cabinet level, if war starts
without UN cover.' (Guardian, 9 Jan., p. 1) 'At the moment
I do not think there is enough justification for military action,
and all ministers feel the same way,' said one senior Government
source. (Telegraph, 8 Jan., p. 4)
Guardian columnist Jackie Ashley is
mordant: 'First the good news for Tony Blair: his cabinet is not
split about Iraq. All this loose talk of divisions is so much
journalistic hot air. Second, the not-so-good news for our prime
minister: the cabinet is not split only because it is united in
deep angst and worry about what he is up to.' (Guardian,
10 Jan., p. 21) (Note: Ms Ashley says, 'Ministers will attend
a "political" Cabinet in two weeks' time, just days
before the January 27 deadline.')
THE THREAT OF PARTY DISINTEGRATION
The Sunday Telegraph reports
that Tony Blair has been advised to undertake a nationwide tour
explaining the need for military action to counter the growing
threat of mass defections from Labour Party activists. 'The stark
message was delivered to the Prime Minister last week by three
of his most intimate allies in the Cabinet: Tessa Jowell, the
Culture Secretary, Hilary Armstrong, the Chief Whip, and Helen
Liddell, the Scottish Secretary.' Blair responded that he is 'too
busy'. (Sunday Telegraph, 12 Jan., p. 1) The effort will
be led by Geoff Hoon instead.
Three recent surveys of Constituency
Labour Party chairpersons found huge opposition to the idea of
war without a further UN resolution: 89 per cent opposition (74
Constituency Labour Parties, Sunday Telegraph, 12 Jan.,
p. 1); 78 per cent opposition (63 CLPs in Labour's most
vulnerable constituencies, Times, 15 Jan., p. 12); and
'Nearly all Labour Party constituency chairs and agents asked—almost
half the total of those held by government ministers' (33 CLPs—all
of them ministers' constituencies, Independent on Sunday,
12 Jan., p. 6).
The surveys showed a real risk of
mass resignations in the event of British participation in a unilateral
attack on Iraq. The Sunday Telegraph observed, 'Large-scale
resignations would put further pressure on the party, which is
facing the most serious financial crisis in its 102-year history
after a recent drop in donations, union funding and membership
subscriptions.' (Sunday Telegraph, 12 Jan., p. 1)
If there was a second UN resolution
authorising the use of force, however, the Sunday Telegraph
found 49 per cent of CLP chairs would support war with a second
UN resolution, 28 per cent would remain opposed to invasion, 22
per cent were undecided. The Independent on Sunday survey
of ministers' constituency parties found 29 of the 33 surveyed
would support war in the event of UN authorisation, though 'many
were extremely uncomfortable with the prospect'.
BRITISH FOOT-DRAGGING
So a new UN Resolution authorising
military action is politically crucial for the Government. 'British
diplomats say they can win UN support for war only if the inspectors
can corner Saddam, either by finding banned weapons and components
or by forcing him to deny access to sites or to officials. "Nobody
familiar with the inspections process expects them to come up
with the goods in a matter of weeks," a senior British official
said.' (Daily Telegraph, 9 Jan., p. 1)
'British officials hope that London's
reservations and Mr Blair's growing problems in the Labour Party
will help to tip the balance in the Bush administration in favour
of delay. But they accept that Britain will go along with an American-led
war in almost all circumstances, including a conflict in the spring
if Washington is determined to launch an early campaign.'
They hope however to put off the evil
hour, one senior British official saying, "There is an assumption
that there will be a campaign before the summer because of the
heat. The autumn would be just as sensible a time and in the meanwhile
Saddam would be thoroughly constrained by the inspectors."
(Daily Telegraph 9 Jan., p. 1)
This is one reason behind the slow
and partial deployment of British armed forces. At the time of
writing, 'no order has yet been given to send out the estimated
150 Challenger tanks that would form the heart of the British
participation in a large-scale land invasion'. 'There's genuinely
been no decision as yet on sending the offensive stuff,' a 'government
insider' said. (FT, 11 Jan., p. 2)
Earlier, the Telegraph reported
that Mr Blair had been reluctant to order the deployment
of forces to the Gulf because 'it is politically difficult'. The
reasons given included the "overstretch" in the Army
caused by the firemen's strike, the Treasury's reluctance to release
the money for a major deployment and the strong opposition in
the Labour Party. (Telegraph, 11 Dec. 2002)
This way of phrasing the matter obscures
the important role of the anti-war movement outside the Labour
Party. Without the mass mobilisation of the British anti-war movement
outside the party system, there would be much less dissent inside
the Labour Party and in the British Establishment (now quite significant).
Despite the 9 Jan. Telegraph report
that Britain had asked for a delay, according to another report,
'the Prime Minister has not asked for a postponement of military
action until the autumn. The prospect of British troops landing
in southern Iraq in the next few months is still very real.' (Independent
on Sunday, 12 Jan., p. 18)
It may well be that the UK has settled
for now with moving the decisive moment back from 27 Jan., when
UN weapons inspectors give their first major report to the UN
Security Council, to 1 Mar., when they make their second report:
'Government officials are now looking towards the Blix report
on 1 March as the possible trigger for military action, believing
that the UN weapons inspection team will become increasingly frustrated
at Saddam's lack of co-operation.' (Observer, 12 Jan.,
p. 1) The US has signalled 27 Jan. is no longer 'D-Day'.
THE CRUNCH: NO SECOND RESOLUTION
What if there is no second UN Resolution
even in March? The US hawks, represented by Richard Perle, chair
of the Pentagon's Defence Policy Board, say, 'A consensus would
be a useful thing and I think we'd be willing to wait a little
longer to get it but not a long time.' (Telegraph, 10 Jan.,
p. 16) Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy asked Mr Blair
in the House of Commons, 'If the UN weapons inspectorate do not
come forward with concrete evidence of weapons of mass destruction,
but the US, nonetheless, decide to go ahead with military conflict
with Iraq, will Britain be involved?' Mr Blair avoided the question:
'I am not going to speculate on the circumstances that might arise
because both ourselves and the United States have made it very
clear that we seek to resolve this through the United Nations.'
(Times, 9 Jan., p. 14) He leaves his options open.
NOTHING IS INEVITABLE
'One Iraqi specialist encapsulates
the dilemma: "It's hard to imagine the circumstances that
will trigger war, but it's as hard to imagine the circumstances
to stop it." Jack Straw put the odds on war at 60:40 against.
In Washington, it's still the other way round.'(Independent
on Sunday, 12 Jan., p. 18)
Mr Blair's strategy of trying to stamp
his leadership on the Labour Party while also demonstrating his
servility to Washington may be about to self-destruct. The initial
signs of his political peril and indecision were shown in the
Straw-Hoon spat. Mr Straw may have overstepped his instructions,
but his underlying message was the one that he was given by Downing
Street, and that is subscribed to by all ministers: 'war is not
inevitable'. The anti-war movement forced Mr Blair and Mr Bush
down the UN route, and the UN route now eats away at the US timetable
for war. War in spring 2003 is 'politically difficult'—because
of the grassroots mobilisation. Now we must make war 'politically
impossible.'
BOOK
War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Why We Shouldnt Launch Another War
Against Iraq by Milan Rai
'An excellent weapon for all those opposed to Bush's war'.
Tariq Ali
'Excellent'. Alice Mahon MP
'Required reading for anyone concerned
about the risk of war'. Professor Paul Rogers, Bradford
School of Peace Studies
'Timely and important'. Hilary
Wainwright
£10 plus £1.80 p&p.
Please make cheques to ARROW Publications, and send with your
address to 29 Gensing Rd, St Leonards on Sea, East Sussex TN38
0HE.
For more analysis on the UK Government's
dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, view the Counter-Dossier
on the Labour
Against the War website.
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