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8 October 2001
Incontrovertible?
The "Evidence" Against Bin Laden
War has started against Afghanistan -
against terrorist camps, and against the Taliban regime. The British
and US Governments proceeded after convincing key allies that (1)
they possessed 'incontrovertible' proof that Saudi dissident Osama
bin Laden was responsible for the 11 September atrocities (no such
proof exists, as we shall see), and (2) persuading them also that
there was no nonviolent method of securing him for trial for these
crimes.
Despite Government/media propaganda that
the Taliban 'refused to hand over bin Laden', the truth is that
the Taliban have refused to 'hand over Osama bin Laden without
evidence' (Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef, Taliban ambassador
to Pakistan, Times, 22 Sept.,
p. 1, emphasis added).
According to a report in the Telegraph,
the Taliban actually agreed to extradite bin Laden to Pakistan
on 1 Oct.: 'The proposal, which had bin Laden's approval, was
that within the framework of Islamic shar'ia law evidence of his
alleged involvement in the New York and Washington attacks would
be placed before an international tribunal. The court would decide
whether to try him on the spot or hand him over to America.' The
deal was vetoed by President Musharraf of Pakistan. (Telegraph,
4 Oct., p. 9, see ARROW anti-war briefing
5 for more details.)
This agreement makes it clear that earlier
offers by the Taliban were genuine: extradition might really have
been possible if credible evidence against bin Laden had been
provided earlier to the Taliban regime. But President Bush 'peremptorily
dismissed a request from the Taliban for proof that Mr bin Laden
was behind the outrages on 11 September.' (Independent,
22 Sept., p. 1) This was the consistent US/UK position.
The Dossier
The British and US Governments have provided
an openly published dossier of 'evidence' from the British Government;
a confidential briefing to NATO ambassadors (which won their support);
and a confidential briefing of President Musharraf of Pakistan
(which appeared to win his support).
First, the famous 70 point dossier published
by Tony Blair - savaged by the British broadsheet press. Bronwen
Maddox, Foreign Editor of the Times,
describes it as 'a puzzling and worrying piece of work' with 'so
many puzzling omissions that the document begins to undermine
itself.' She feels it was 'more significant for what it leaves
out than for what it leaves in', with 'few clues even to the form
of evidence for September 11: almost nothing on money or phone
records'. It 'seems lame - to the point of advertising a deficiency
- to say that a signature of an al-Qaeda attack is the absence
of a warning'. (Al-Qaeda being bin Laden's 'network'.)
'There is nothing hard enough in it to convince
sceptics in either London or Washington, let alone Kabul.' It
is 'a political dance, not a serious attempt to preach to the
unconverted', a 'paper shield' for President Musharraf of Pakistan,
and the rulers of Saudi Arabia. (Times,
5 Oct., p. 8)
The dossier is described by the Independent
on Sunday as 'conjecture, supposition and assertions of fact',
a work that 'uses every trick in the Whitehall drafter's arsenal
to make the reader believe they are reading something they are
not: a damning indictment of Mr bin Laden for the events of 11
September.' (7 Oct., p. 7). The dossier is 'almost worthless from
a legal point of view'. (Guardian
editorial, 5 Oct., p. 23) The document 'took us no further than
the information already in the public domain.' (Independent,
5 Oct., Review p. 3) The Telegraph suggests there is 'powerful
evidence' against bin Laden - but not in the dossier. Still-secret
intelligence evidence convinces those who have seen it: 'We are
happy to take it on trust'. (5 Oct., p. 29) The Telegraph
does not refer to the dossier at all, a telling sign of its weakness.
Nine Points
Most of the material in the dossier does
not deal with 11 September. 'Only nine of the 70 points in the
document relate to the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon'. (Robert Fisk, Independent, 5 Oct., p. 5) For Bronwen
Maddox, it is 'striking', given the dossier's purpose, 'that apparently
the most solid evidence refers to the 1998 attacks [on US Embassies].
There is comparatively little on September 11.' (Times,
5 Oct., p. 8)
One claim is that Osama bin Laden warned
his closest associates to return to Afghanistan by 10 Sept. (para
62) The Guardian pointed out that
'Dozens of men suspected of having links to bin Laden's al-Qaida
network have been detained in Britain, Germany, France, Spain,
Belgium, and the Netherlands' and US reports say 'that four or
five al-Qaida cells remain in the US and have either been detained
or are under surveillance'. There have been 'no confirmed cases
so far of known al-Qaida members being ordered back to Afghanistan
on the eve of the attack.' (5 Oct., p. 5) The Independent on Sunday
concluded that 'if there was advice to go to Afghanistan, presumably
[these agents] ignored it or did not receive it.' (7 Oct., p.
7, emph. added) The evidence indicates no such recall was issued.
Associates And Rival Groups
The dossier alleges that three of the hijackers
were 'associates of al-Qaeda'. (para 61) Senior British lawyer
Anthony Scrivener QC is troubled by the word "associate":
it 'gives the impression that they are not members of that organisation
and I would certainly wish to examine the evidence to see what
associates really means.' (Times,
5 Oct., p. 7) The Independent on Sunday
comments that the word "associate" 'suggests the authorities
lack intelligence on al-Qa'ida: they think they know who may be
involved but they are not sure, and they are not certain where
they come in the pecking order - hence the catch-all "associate".'
(7 Oct., p. 7)
Anthony Scrivener QC also seized on another
crucial weakness of the dossier: the claim that 'No other organisation
has both the motivation and the capability to carry out attacks
like those of September 11'. (para 69) For Scrivener, 'the main
problem' with the dossier is the fact that 'there are other terrorist
groups who share the same hatred of the Americans who might have
carried out this atrocity. (Times,
5 Oct., p. 7)
The Times
pointed out that the dossier did not mention the 1994 attempt
by the 'Armed Islamic Group' of Algeria 'to crash a hijacked plane
into the Eiffel Tower': 'Intelligence experts are sceptical' about
the claim that no other group has the motivation and capability
to carry out such attacks. (Times,
5 Oct., p. 4)
Legal Opinions
Richard Gordon QC said that bin Laden's alleged
prior record (as set out in the dossier) 'shows, in the language
of the lawyers, propensity, but it proves little.' (Independent
on Sunday, 7 Oct., p. 7)
Nick Blake QC, of human rights lawyers Matrix
Chambers, said the evidence in the dossier could feasibly support
charges of incitement to murder; there were 'debatable' grounds
for a a charge of conspiracy to murder; but it would need 'more
concrete evidence to obtain an indictment for murder against bin
Laden': 'Nothing in the disclosed material shows actual participation
in the murders as opposed to giving approval to terrorist attacks.'
(Telegraph, 5 Oct., p. 6)
Anthony Scrivener QC said, 'it is a sobering
thought that better evidence is required to prosecute a shoplifter
than is needed to commence a world war'. (Times,
5 Oct., p. 7)
NATO
NATO ambassadors were subjected to a 40 minute
oral presentation by US State Department counter-terrorism envoy
Frank Taylor, which led Lord Robertson to declare the evidence
against bin Laden 'incontrovertible.' However, the secretary-general
of the alliance was contradicted by NATO diplomats who said (anonymously)
'that the US presentations could not show, beyond doubt, real
factual hard evidence, apart from the names of several of the
hijackers, details of where they had studied, and their backgrounds.'
(FT, 5 Oct., p. 6) Not much incontrovertible
secret intelligence material there.
Pakistan
For the Times, 'Nothing could more powerfully
validate the proof' that Osama bin Laden is guilty 'than the acceptance
by Pakistan that there were sufficient grounds for indictment
in a court of law'. '[N]o country has greater reason for wanting
to claim that the evidence is still ambiguous.' (5 Oct., p. 23)
Unfortunately for the Times, this is precisely the Pakistani position:
President Musharraf has said, 'I personally and my government
feel that there is evidence which is leading to an association
between the terror acts and Osama bin Laden.' (FT,
6 Oct., p. 7) Merely 'leading to an association'!
Earlier a Pakistani Foreign Ministry official
had indeed said that there were grounds for an indictment, but
Mohammed Riaz Khan pointed out that information provided to Pakistan
'related to both pre-September 11 incidents and also to the September
11 events'. 'Mr Khan side-stepped reporters' questions as to whether
the evidence pertaining to the September 11 attacks provided clear
grounds for a court indictment on their own.' (FT,
5 Oct., p. 6)
Unconvinced
The secret intelligence shown to the Pakistanis
did not convince them. 'There is no evidence presented [in the
dossier] that directly links bin Laden to September 11.' (Bronwen
Maddox, Times, 5 Oct., p. 8) Given
the distortions and omissions in the Government's dossier, there
are no grounds for believing 'incontrovertible evidence' exists
to support the Government's bold assertions. The British Government
has launched a war which may cost tens of thousands of lives through
famine with less "evidence" on display than is needed
to prosecute a shoplifter.
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