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10 February
2003
Game Over
Bush & Powell Try To Shut Down The Inspectors
WAR PLAN IRAQ Update Number 8
CO-OPERATION IS IRRELEVANT
President Bush is determined to go to war, whatever Baghdad does:
'Saddam Hussein can now be expected to begin another round of
empty concessions, transparently false denials. No doubt he will
play a last minute game of deception. The game is over.' (Telegraph,
7 Feb., p. 1) 'It would not surprise the US if Saddam Hussein
pretends all of a sudden to have a change of heart and allow the
U2 to fly or to show up with some of the weapons he promised he
never had,' a White House spokesperson said. 'But it wouldn't
change the fact that Saddam Hussein is not co-operating.' (Times,
7 Feb., p. 1) However much Iraq actually co-operates with the
weapons inspectors, 'Saddam is not co-operating'. In his barnstorming
briefing to the UN Security Council on 5 Feb., Colin Powell said,
'The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give
the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction, but how
much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance
before we, as a council, we, as the United Nations, say, "Enough.
Enough".' (Telegraph, 6 Feb., p. 1) The only possible fate
for the inspectors is to be 'frustrated by obstruction'. The US
Secretary of State was more direct earlier: 'The question isn't
how much longer do you need for inspections to work. Inspections
will not work.' (Independent, 23 Jan., p. 1)
One aim of the Powell presentation to the Security Council was
to undermine public and international confidence in the inspection
agencies.
THE TAJI FACILITY SHELL GAME
The most striking images used in the 5 Feb. presentation were
of the Taji weapons facility. One satellite photo from 10 Nov.
2002 shows two shapes by a bunker-one is alleged to be a decontamination
vehicle, and the other a security building for monitoring leakages
from the chemical weapons allegedly stored in the bunker. A second
photo taken on 22 Dec., shows UN weapons inspectors' vehicles
approaching the 'sanitized bunkers'-from which the vehicle and
security building seem to have been removed. Jonathan Ban, a chemical
weapons expert at the Washington-based Chemical and Biological
Arms Control Institute, found the juxtaposition of the two images
'strange': 'It wasn't clear to me whether the bunkers that were
shown in the second image were the same ones that were shown in
the first. If that is what they are claiming, then I would have
liked to see more detail of the decontamination truck and the
security building being moved. And if they were different buildings,
what happened to the active bunkers when the weapons inspectors
showed up? This is something that needs to be explained better.'
(Guardian, 6 Feb., p. 3) Studying the photos, the angle
of the access road behind the bunker, and the presence of trees
in the second photo indicate that the photos actually are of two
quite different bunkers. It seems that the second photo has been
chosen because it includes the inspectors' vehicles driving through
the Taji facility-to dramatise their alleged inability to detect
Iraqi deception.
THE AL-MUSSAYYIB MISDIRECTION
'Mr Powell's case for Iraqi concealment also relied heavily on
interpretation of a second set of satellite images, which captured
the al-Mussayyib weapons facility', allegedly involved in shipping
chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field.
'The first picture, from May last year, showed a bunker surrounded
by what the US said were three 35-tonne cargo trucks, along with
a decontamination vehicle-strong evidence according to Mr Powell
that the site was being used for chemical or biological weapons
activity. A second image, taken two months later, showed that
the entire site [actually only part of the site-ARROW] had been
bulldozed and the earth freshly graded to conceal banned weapons
activity from UN inspection teams. The images were hugely important
for the US case, because, said Mr Powell, an Iraqi human source
had confirmed that the chemical weapons had been removed at that
time.' On 13 Dec., inspectors went to al- Mussayyib and found
only ready- to-use pesticides. Jonathan Ban again: 'I find it
very difficult to believe that if there was chemical weapons contamination
in the area that the Iraqis would be able to completely get rid
of that contamination. The image shows that there are some areas
of ground on the site that haven't been graded and I think the
inspectors would be able to take samples from there to prove conclusively
whether or not there has been recent chemical weapons activity.'
(Guardian, 6 Feb., p. 3) Sounds like a job for those
inspectors that Mr Powell says are pointless.
US FLOUTS RESOLUTION 1441
UN Resolution 1441, which Colin Powell exhorts us all to re-read,
'Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and
the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing
any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects
of their mandates'. (Para. 10) The Resolution was passed on 8
Nov. 2002, but these dramatic photos from May, July, Nov. and
Dec. 2002 were not handed over to UNMOVIC- they were kept to be
publicly displayed on 5 Feb. 2003. THE MOBILE CONFIDENCE TRICK
'Because Powell's slideshow showed Iraq giving the UN inspectors
the runaround, it also weakened Blix's argument that more time
would bring success. Talking of the 18 lorries that are believed
to be mobile biological weapons factories, Powell asked rhetorically
how long it would take to find even a single one among the "thousands
and thousands of trucks" on Iraq's roads... Blix's report
to the UN last week put the US on the back foot, in arguing that
the inspectors deserved more time. Powell's performance yesterday
won back a lot of that ground.' (Times, 6 Feb., p. 15)
In the real world, 'Biowar experts concede that no scheme is too
crazy for Saddam. Still, they say, truck-mounted labs would be
all but unworkable. The required ventilation systems would make
them instantly recognizable from above, and they would need special
facilities to safely dispose of their deadly wastes. A routine
highway accident could be catastrophic. And US intelligence, after
years of looking for them, has never found even one.' (Newsweek,
17 Feb., p. 20)
I SAY, I SAY, HEARSAY
Richard Beeston of The Times observed that, 'most of
what General Powell said was open to interpretation. There was
no named high-ranking defector prepared to
substantiate the allegations. There was no visual evidence of
soldiers or scientists handling weapons such as chemical or biological
weapons, nor even attempting to
conceal huge items such as Scud missiles.' His colleague Michael
Evans noted that there were 'no pictures of the inside' of any
of the alleged mobile biological weapons laboratories, nor 'photographic
evidence' of a chemical weapons programme. (Times, 6
Feb., p. 14) Joseph Cirincione, senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC, said, 'We
should never go to war based on a defector's tale. There's a long
history of defectors' tales being erroneous... It is a problem
that detectives have all the time; somebody comes to them hoping
to get something in exchange.' (Guardian, 6 Feb., p.
2) 'He barraged the members [of the Security Council] with questions:
"Who took the hard drives? Where did they go? What's being
hidden? Why?" Yet he offered few answers and much speculation.'
(Guardian, 6 Feb., p. 1) Egyptian political scientist
Emad Shahin observed wryly, and accurately, 'The speech was long
on accusations, and short on evidence.' (Telegraph, 7
Feb., p. 14)
THE TAPES
Many Western observers were convinced by intercepted conversations
between Iraqi military officials. 'But doubts remain about the
credibility of the tapes, not least because many observers doubt
that senior Iraqi officers would speak so carelessly on open telephone
or radio conversations. The conversations were also open to interpretation.
Jonathan Ban, a chemical weapons specialist said. "For example,
what do they mean by a 'modified vehicle'? That could mean absolutely
anything as could 'prohibited ammo'."
(Guardian, 6 Feb., p. 2)
EVEN THE SPIES REVOLT
Before his speech, it was reported that Powell 'yesterday appeared
to pull back from claims that he would show the United Nations
a link between al- Qaeda and Iraq, amid anger among Washington's
spies over the way intelligence was being distorted to prove the
link existed.' (Telegraph, 4 Feb., p. 13) There is evidence
that the supposed 'link' man, Abu Musab Zarqawi, was treated in
Baghdad, but there is no evidence he contacted Iraqi officials:
'The intelligence is practically non-existent', said one 'exasperated
American intelligence source'. The source went on: 'It is impossible
to support the bald conclusions being made by the White House
and the Pentagon given the poor quantity and quality of the intelligence
available. There is uproar within the intelligence community on
all of these points, but the Bush White House has quashed dissent.'
The Telegraph commented, 'This could all be dismissed as a turf
war between rival intelligence agencies were it not for the near
unanimity across the British and American intelligence communities,
including the Defence Intelligence Agency analysts whose bosses
produced the line the White House wanted to hear.' (Telegraph,
4 Feb. 2003, p. 13) Despite the uproar, Powell trotted out the
Party line.
1998 ALL OVER AGAIN
President Bush famously said, 'This looks like a re-run of a bad
movie and I'm not interested in watching.' (Guardian,
22 Jan., p. 1) Let's remember that in Dec. 1998 the inspection
agency UNSCOM was driven out by the US, not by Baghdad. UNSCOM
chief Richard Butler records in his memoirs that he was called
in by US Ambassador to the UN Peter Burleigh, and advised to be
'prudent' with the safety of UNSCOM staff. 'Repeating a familiar
script, I told him that I would act on this advice and remove
my staff from Iraq.' (Saddam Defiant, p. 224) UNSCOM
withdrew, creating the right political climate for days of US/UK
military strikes, and leading to the destruction of the agency.
The US shut down UNSCOM in 1998 to pave the way for war. President
Bush is trying to re-run this bad movie with UNSCOM's successor,
UNMOVIC. He must be stopped.
BOOK
War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Why We Shouldnt Launch Another War
Against Iraq by Milan Rai
'An excellent weapon for all those opposed to Bush's war'. Tariq
Ali
'Excellent'. Alice Mahon MP
'Required reading for anyone concerned about the risk of war'.
Professor Paul Rogers, Bradford School of Peace Studies
'Timely and important'. Hilary Wainwright
£10 plus £1.80 p&p.
Please make cheques to ARROW Publications, and send with your
address to 29 Gensing Rd, St Leonards on Sea, East Sussex TN38
0HE.
ARROW
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