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16 December 2002
MOMENT OF
DECISION
Blair Forced To Choose War Or Inspections
WAR PLAN IRAQ Update Number 4
THE CRITICAL, 'POLITICALLY DIFFICULT', DECISIONS
On 14 Dec. 2002, the newspaper closest to Britain's Armed Forces
reported, "Defence chiefs have told the Prime Minister that
he must decide within 10 days whether British forces should be
sent to the Gulf if they are to be a credible threat to Iraq."
(Telegraph, 14 Dec., p. 1) The newspaper continued, "Despite
publicly stating that he will stand alongside America in any action
against Iraq, Mr Blair has delayed ordering troops to the Gulf
to give diplomacy a chance."
An earlier report had revealed certain more pressing reasons behind
the British delays: "Senior Government sources" said
Blair had been reluctant to order the deployment of forces to
the Gulf because "it is politically difficult": "The
reasons include the 'overstretch' in the Army caused by the firemen's
strike, the Treasury's reluctance to release the money for a major
deployment and the strong opposition in the Labour Party."
(Telegraph, 11 Dec., p. 14)
This is a little disingenuous: the 'strong opposition' which is
making the war 'politically difficult' extends well beyond the
Labour Party - into the military and the right-wing Establishment,
as well as into the general population and the massive grassroots
mobilisation of the anti-war movement.
BUDGET PROBLEMS
As for the Treasury's reluctance to release funds for the war
- "The Ministry of Defence estimates the cost of a war at
around 1.5 billion", but "The Treasury has put aside
only 1 billion and said that anything more must come from the
existing defence budget." (Telegraph, 14 Dec., p.
1)
In Aug. 2002, the Treasury estimated that the war could cost the
UK up to 4bn all told. Gordon Brown, the Chancellor, was reported
to have had 'blistering' arguments with the Prime Minister over
the war, pointing out that paying for the war could be a body
blow to New Labours spending plans for health, education, and
transport - with highly damaging consequences for the Government's
re- election campaign, as well as for the quality of life for
the people of Britain. (Sunday Mirror, 11 Aug., p. 6)
DELAYS COULD SCALE DOWN BRITISH PARTICIPATION
British military commanders have said that, "whether the
troops are to go to war with or to be used only as a threat to
coerce Saddam Hussein into giving up his weapons of mass destruction,
the same equipment needs to be in place. That includes a lighly
armoured division." As any war would need to be fought before
the weather turned too hot, "such a division has to be in
Kuwait by late February to present a credible threat." "That
means that preparations to move tanks must be made within 10 days
[by 25 Dec.]. Otherwise, Saddam could be given the impression
that Britain is reluctant to go to war." (Telegraph,
14 Dec., p. 1)
Britain is reluctant to go to war. The British people are
reluctant to go to war: a News of the World/ICM poll found
42 per cent of Britons opposed to war if there is no proof Iraq
has weapons of mass destruction, with only 38 per cent supporting
war in such circumstances. (15 Dec., p. 11) (If Iraq is proven
to have acquired new weapons of mass destruction, however, the
poll found a majority in favour of 'a military attack on Iraq'
- 61 per cent against 25 per cent opposed.) British soldiers are
reluctant to go to war, as they have made clear repeatedly (see
Milan Rai, War Plan Iraq, 'GI
Joe Says No' chapter). And even the British Government has got
cold feet, as we shall see.
Returning to the issue of Britains participation in any US invasion
of Iraq, "British contingency planning in Iraq has envisaged
deploying a 'light' armoured division of up to 23,000 men. But
the Governments delayin deploying troops to the Gulf means it
is now virtuallyimpossible for such a force to fight a campaign
before February": "An early war in January means Britain
would only be able to contribute lighter forces such as the SAS,
16 Air Assault Brigade and the Royal Marines 3 Commando Brigade
- numbering at most several thousand troops, as well as combat
aircraft and a naval force." (Telegraph, 11 Dec.,
p. 14)
There will be a sizeable British naval contribution - the aircraft
carrier HMS Ark Royal will lead a 2,600-person, six-vessel task
force that includes a submarine capable of firing Tomahawk cruise
missiles. This is much smaller than in 1991, when Britain sent
19 vessels to the Gulf. "Nevertheless, the dispatch of the
Naval Task Group... contrasts with delays in sending the armoured
division" which could take eight weeks to refit for desert
warfare. (Sunday Telegraph, 15 Dec., p. 1) Troops will
also require 'several weeks' to deploy and acclimatise - "Under
current contingencies, troops earmarked for Iraq are likely to
be allowed to spend Christmas at how with their families before
beginning the move to the Gulf." (Times, 14 Dec.,
p. 1)
Says the Observer, "Although a large force of between
10,000 and 20,000 troops has not been ruled out, defence officials
said a smaller force was more likely": "An elite force
of 2,000 [Royal] Marines with air support and medical back-up
is being planned as Britain's initial contribution to possible
military action against Iraq, according to Ministry of Defence
sources". A 'senior Whitehall figure' told the Observer,
"If it were a smaller force, then it would only be a matter
of weeks before they could be made ready. It is true that February
is the most likely window for attack, [but] we must remember that
we are still inthe planning stage, [and] all options are being
considered." The small, 2,000-strong force is, according
to this source, now the 'preferred option' by British military
planners. (15 Dec., p. 2)
This contrasts with the reports in the Telegraph. It is
likely that the Chiefs of Staff are pressing for an armoured division
to be deployed, despite the delays and costs involved - and the
increase in the number of British lives put at risk in the war
- while lower-ranking planners are accommodating to the financial
and political realities imposed by the Prime Minister and Chancellor.
"Well- placed sources said the Government is now considering
the option of sending a much smaller force than originally envisaged":
A 'senior British source' said, "The United States needs
us politically, not militarily. They can do this by themselves,
with a few Brtiish troops for the cameras." (Telegraph,
11 Dec., p. 14)
TONY BLAIR'S COLD FEET
"A senior Whitehall source said the Prime Minister still
hoped to avoid a war": "Tony Blair has fought hard to
go down theUN route and wants it pursued as vigorously as possible.
If there is any chance of avoiding a war he will make every effort
to seize it." (Telegraph, 11 Dec., p. 14) War is 'politically
difficult', and the Prime Minister is reluctant to pay the political
price involved.
" The resumption of United Nations weapons inspections in
Iraq raised hope among some British officials that the process
would stretch out over several months and that America would revert
to a policy of containment rather than 'regime change' through
military force." (Telegraph, 11 Dec., p. 14) "According
to authoritative sources, the Prime Minister [delayed decisions
on military deployments, because he] wanted to ensure that the
UN had a free rein to exploit all diplomatic efforts and to give
weapons inspectors a reasonable period to do their work."
(Times, 14 Dec., p. 1)
Diplomatic Editor of the Daily Telegraph, Anton La Guardia:
"The resumption of weapons inspections in Iraq puts in place
another element of Britain's unspoken diplomatic strategy: the
'dual containment' of Saddam Hussein and Americas hawks".
"Some senior British officials now talk of a prolonged inspection
period that puts off the war indefinitely. 'Iraq is not a global
threat. Its a regional threat', said one senior Whitehall source.
'The policy of containment, if done properly, is the most desirable.
If Iraq can be contained, the risks of war will outweigh the benefits'
". Britain is "less concerned than Washington by the
prospect of allowing Saddam to play for time while inspectors
search". While US hawks see Resolution 1441, which imposes
tough new conditions on Iraq, as a 'trigger' for war, "British
officiails, who never liked the idea of regime change, hope it
will be a 'safety catch' that will establish their preferred policy
of containment." (Telegraph, 28 Nov., p. 18)
THE STEAMROLLER AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
If there is 'proof' that Iraq has failed to make a full and complete
weapons declaration, and if a confrontation can be engineered
over inspections - probably over demands to fly Iraqi scientists
out of the country (see Briefing
23), the US will return to the Security Council and demand
a new Resolution which can be interpreted as authorising the use
of force. Washington will make it clear that it intends to launch
a war with or without a new resolution, hoping to bounce the Security
Council into granting some form of authorisation to use force
against Iraq.
"Washington believes the Iraqis will be seen either trying
to conceal weapons material or will be caught out. The UN Security
Council will be allowed a short time to debate, but the Pentagon
will already have launched the final, brief countdown to war."
(Sunday Telegraph, 17 Nov., p. 35)
A US source said, "the key word in the resolution is 'assess'.
The UN has to assess whether it agrees Iraq is in material breach
of its obligations, but it does not have the power to decide this
issue. That gives the President the freedom he needs." (Observer,
8 Dec., pp. 20/21) True, Resolution 1441 does not explicitly say
that only a new Resolution from the Security Council can authorise
the use of force, but nothing in the Resolution actually authorises
the use of force. No permission has been granted for a US/UK war
on Iraq. (See Briefing 25 Material Breach for more on legality
and the Resolutions.)
John Simpson of the BBC comments, "The possibility that the
United Nations will not give Mr Bush its support for an attack
on Iraq certainly exists, and the choice which would then lie
before Tony Blair would be distinctly awkward: if he joins in
the bombing without UN support, it will break the Labour Party
apart." (Sunday Telegraph, 15 Dec., p. 14) The
political costs threatened by the anti-war movement has created
reluctance and delay at the highest levels of the British Government,
and may have scaled down British participation in the planned
war effort.
BOOK
War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons Why We Shouldnt Launch Another War
Against Iraq by Milan Rai
'An excellent weapon for all those opposed to Bush's war'.
Tariq Ali
'Excellent'. Alice Mahon MP
'Required reading for anyone concerned
about the risk of war'. Professor Paul Rogers, Bradford
School of Peace Studies
'Timely and important'. Hilary
Wainwright
£10 plus £1.80 p&p.
Please make cheques to ARROW Publications, and send with your
address to 29 Gensing Rd, St Leonards on Sea, East Sussex TN38
0HE.
For more analysis on the UK Government's
dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, view the Counter-Dossier
on the Labour
Against the War website.
ARROW
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