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10 July 2002
Torpedoing
the Inspectors
The
US Undermines The UN Weapons Inspectors
THE MISSING DOSSIER
On 11 March 2002, President Bush
signalled his determination to attack Iraq: ‘Men with no respect
for life must never be allowed to control the ultimate instruments
of death.’ (Times, 12 March 2002, p. 23.) ‘Mr Blair was
more hawkish than Mr Bush, declaring emphatically that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction: "There is a threat from Saddam
and the weapons of mass destruction he has acquired. It is not
in doubt."’ (Guardian, 12 March 2002, p. 1)
The Prime Minister has
failed to provide any evidence to support this assertion. Downing
Street briefed the press that a damning new dossier on Iraq’s
weapons would be released in early April. ‘Blair has encouraged
expectations among MPs and cabinet colleagues that [this] intelligence
dossier would provide fresh support for action to overthrow the
Iraqi dictator. But there is little new information worth sharing
or publishing, according to insiders.’ (Sunday Times,
10 March 2002, p. 2) ‘Mr Blair has deferred publication of a dossier
of evidence against Mr Saddam, fearing that it would inflame matters
while not presenting a convincing case.’ (Financial Times,
8 April 2002, p. 24) The dossier remains unpublished.
Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC,
the new UN weapons inspection agency which has replaced UNSCOM,
has said he ‘does not accept as fact the US and UK’s repeated
assertions that Baghdad has used the time to rebuild its weapons
of mass destruction.’ (Financial Times, 7 March 2002, p.
20)
THE NEED FOR INSPECTORS
David Albright, former UN weapons inspector,
remarks, ‘The evidence produced so far is worrying. It is an argument
for getting the inspectors back in as fast as possible, but not
for going to war.’ (Observer, 17 March 2002, p. 15) But
the US seems to have little interest in ‘getting the inspectors
back in as fast as possible.’
AN OFFER REJECTED
It’s not just the US:
Britain has also shown a lack of interest in inspections. In March,
Baghdad invited Britain to send weapons inspectors. ‘Iraq is ready
to receive right now any British team sent by Blair and accompanied
by the British media to show the world where and how is Iraq developing
such weapons,’ said an unidentified Iraqi spokesperson in the
official al-Thawra newspaper. (Associated Press report,
1 March 2002) This news wire report was ignored by the Government,
and by the media, apart from a buried note and a one-line reference
in an editorial. (Independent, 4 March 2002, p. 2; Times,
8 March 2002, p. 23) Such offers should be explored, not ignored.
DON’T TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER
‘Senior German and French
politicians argue that negotiations and a resumption of United
Nations arms inspections are the way forward - a view that provokes
exasperation in Washington.’ (Telegraph, 17 June 2002,
p. 1) ‘Key figures in the White House believe that demands on
Saddam to re-admit United Nations weapons inspectors should be
set so high that he would fail to meet them unless he provided
officials with total freedom.’ (Times, 16 February 2002,
p. 19) A US intelligence official has said the White House ‘will
not take yes for an answer’. (Guardian, 14 February
2002, p. 1)
Seymour Hersh, the
noted US investigative reporter wrote in December 2001: ‘Inside
the Administration, there is general consensus on one issue, officials
told me: there will be no further effort to revive the
UN inspection regime withdrawn in late 1998’. (New Yorker,
24 December 2001, p. 63)
INSPECTIONS: THE NIGHTMARE SCENARIO
According to one former
US official, ‘The hawks’ nightmare is that inspectors will
be admitted, will not be terribly vigorous and not find anything.
Economic sanctions would be eased, and the U.S. will be unable
to act... and the closer it comes to the 2004 elections the
more difficult it will be to take the military route.’ (Washington
Post, 15 April 2002, p. A01) ‘The more hawkish members of
the US defence department are said to favour direct military action
on Iraq, which would be more difficult if weapons inspectors were
on the ground.’ (FT, 5 March 2002, p. 10)
It’s not just the
hawks. US Secretary of State Colin Powell has made it clear that
the US is intent on war, whatever happens with the inspectors:
‘US policy is that, regardless of what the inspectors do,
the people of Iraq and the people of the region would be better
off with a different regime in Baghdad. The United States reserves
its option to do whatever it believes might be appropriate to
see if there can be a regime change.’ The issue of the inspectors
is a ‘separate and distinct and different’ matter from
the US position on Saddam Hussein’s leadership, said Powell. (Guardian,
6 May 2002)
US National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice ‘dodged a question on whether the inspections
issue provides justification for US military action against Iraq’.
She said that Saddam Hussein ‘is not likely to ever convince the
world, in a reliable way, that he is going to live at peace with
his neighbours, that he will not seek weapons of mass destruction,
and that he will not repress his own people.’ (Guardian,
6 May 2002)
The ‘principals’ in the Bush Administration ‘fear that Saddam
is working his own UN angle for the return of weapons inspectors
to Iraq, whose presence could make the US look like a bully if
it invades.’ ‘"The White House’s biggest fear is that
UN weapons inspectors will be allowed to go in," says
a top Senate foreign policy aide.’ (Time magazine, 13 May
2002, p. 38)
Inspectors are
not part of the solution, they are part of the problem, as
far as the Bush Administration is concerned. Without inspectors,
Iraq cannot be verifiably disarmed - the 1991 Gulf War proved
that - but, for the US, preventing the development of weapons
of mass destruction is secondary to overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
Inspectors hinder the war effort, and they must be undermined.
UNDERMINING THE INSPECTORS I
Former UN weapons inspector
Scott Ritter recalls that when he was UNSCOM’s chief inspector,
there were dozens of men from US Special Forces, or from CIA paramilitary
teams, under his command. When it was leaked in June 2002 that
the CIA had been directed to capture or kill Saddam Hussein, Ritter
remarked, ‘Now that Bush has specifically authorized American
covert-operations forces to remove Hussein, however, the Iraqis
will never trust an inspection regime that has already shown itself
susceptible to infiltration and manipulation by intelligence services
hostile to Iraq, regardless of any assurances the U.N. secretary-general
might give.’ (Los Angeles Times, 19 June, 2002)
For Ritter, ‘The leaked CIA covert operations plan effectively
kills any chance of inspectors returning to Iraq’. It closes ‘the
last opportunity for shedding light on the true state of affairs
regarding any threat in the form of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.’
(Los Angeles Times, 19 June, 2002)
UNDERMINING THE INSPECTORS II
The UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has been attempting to negotiate the return of weapons inspectors
to Iraq. During his third round of negotiations with Iraqi diplomats,
the US leaked a detailed Pentagon war planning document to the
press, spelling out some of the military options under consideration.
‘The leak to the New York Times - this sort of document
never surfaces by accident - seems to be a clear attempt to raise
the stakes after a new round of talks in [Vienna] between Iraq
and the United Nations failed to produce agreement on the return
of UN weapons inspectors’. (Independent on Sunday, 7 July
2002, p. 14)
True, the leak was
no accident, but it did not come after the talks failed,
it came in the middle of the talks, published on the morning
of the second day of negotiations. A participant in the UN-Iraq
talks, no doubt a UN official, said the leaked document ‘did not
help’, as negotiations floundered. (Financial Times, 6
July 2002, p. 1) ‘The UN’s failure will come as a relief to many
in the Pentagon, where senior officials fear that inspections
might be granted some form of access, then give Saddam a clean
bill of health he did not deserve.’ (Telegraph, 6 July
2002, p. 16) How can Pentagon officials know that Iraq does not
deserve a clean bill of health? They have made no moves to publish
evidence to the contrary.
UNDERMINING THE INSPECTORS III
One of the problems bedevilling
the UN-Iraq negotiations is a list of nineteen questions that
Baghdad submitted to Kofi Annan earlier in the year. ‘The questions
range from technical to political, including queries about what
type of weapons [the] inspectors would be looking to find in Iraq,
concerns over the UK and US air patrols of northern Iraq, and
questions about the creation of a "weapons free zone"
in the Middle East.’ (FT, 5 July 2002, p. 10)
‘Not in a position
to answer the questions, Mr Annan forwarded them to the Security
Council.’ ‘Mr Annan never received any response to the questions
from the Security Council.’ (FT, 5 July 2002, p. 10) The
central question: ‘Iraqi officials have sought assurances that
the US would call off its planned military campaign if Baghdad
co-operated on weapons inspectors.’ (FT, 6 July 2002,
p. 1) The US refused to respond, undermining the inspection effort.
The US/UK position is that, ‘Attempting to answer [the 19 questions]
would have played into Iraq’s hands, weakening Mr Annan’s ability
to persuade Baghdad to allow the inspectors back into the country,
diplomats said’ at the UN. (FT, 5 July 2002, p. 10) The
very reverse of the truth. The only way to persuade Iraq to accept
a resumption of inspections is to be absolutely clear about the
nature of the package, and to offer security from invasion while
inspections continue.
CONCLUSION
Baghdad has sometimes
said new inspections will never be permitted or only after sanctions
are lifted; then at other times states that the new inspection
body will be admitted, if ‘the locations to be searched
are identified and a timetable is set up and respected.’ (FT,
19 March 2002, p. 11) ‘Analysts said Iraq would try to drag out
the diplomatic process and would be likely to agree to allow inspectors
back only when it felt a US military attack was imminent.’ (FT,
6 July 2002, p. 1) Washington is not helping. The US is attempting
to torpedo fragile UN-led efforts to return weapons inspectors
to Iraq - with leaked threats, and by refusing to answer reasonable
questions about its intentions.
BOOK This is a shortened chapter from a ARROW book by Milan
Rai, available in Sept.
ARROW
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