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18 February 2002
War
Plan Iraq
The US Targets Saddam Hussein:
‘Leadership
Change’ Not ‘Regime Change’
No Justification for War
- No Link to 11 September
The United States is now set on
war with Iraq. What justification is there for such a war? Occasionally
it has been suggested that Iraq was somehow linked to the 11 September
attacks. The strongest alleged link has been the supposed meeting
of Mohammed Atta, the 11 September ringleader, and an Iraqi diplomat
expelled from the Czech Republic for spying. The two are meant
to have met in Prague in 2001, a ‘fact’ confirmed by Czech interior
minister Stanislav Gross in Oct. 2001. When the Czech police completed
their inquiry in Dec. 2001, however, ‘Jiri Kolar, the police chief,
said there were no documents showing that Atta visited Prague
at any time this year [2001], although he had visited twice in
2000’. Another man by the name of Mohammed Atta did visit Prague
in 2001, but according to a Czech intelligence source, ‘He didn’t
have the same identity card number, there was a great difference
in their ages, their nationalities didn’t match, basically nothing.
It was someone else.’ (Daily Telegraph, 18 Dec. 2001, p.
10) Despite the disintegration of this fable, it continues to
circulate and to be repeated as fact. Useful lies can live for
a long time.
As for any links between
Baghdad and al-Qaeda, an anonymous former CIA officer has remarked
that, ‘The reality is that Osama bin Laden doesn’t like Saddam
Hussein. Saddam is a secularist who has killed more Islamic clergy
than he has Americans. They have almost nothing in common except
a hatred of the US. Saddam is the ultimate control freak, and
for him terrorists are the ultimate loose cannon.’ (Daily Telegraph,
20 Sept. 2001, p. 10)
No
Justification for War - Weapons of Mass Destruction
‘Initially, Washington included
Iraq on its list of countries with links to al-Qaeda, but when
European governments insisted that there was no intelligence evidence
connecting Baghdad to Osama bin Laden’s organisation, the US changed
tack. "Now the emphasis is on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
programme and the danger that Saddam might send out his own agents
armed with chemical or biological devices", one [British]
official said.’ (Times, 16 Feb. 2002, p. 19)
The latest CIA report
on the topic (Jan. 2002) says, that without ‘an inspection-monitoring
program’ ‘it is more difficult to determine the current status’
of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programmes. No smoking
gun, then.
Former UN weapons inspector
Scott Ritter has written, ‘Given the comprehensive nature of the
monitoring regime put in place by UNSCOM [UN Special Commission
weapons inspectors], which included a strict export-import control
regime, it was possible as early as 1997 to determine that, from
a qualitative standpoint, Iraq had been disarmed. Iraq no
longer possessed any meaningful quantities of chemical or biological
agent, if it possessed any at all, and the industrial means to
produce these agents had either been eliminated or were subject
to stringent monitoring. The same was true of Iraq's nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities.’ (Arms Control Today, June
2000)
According to Ritter, a
former US Marine, ‘manufacturing CW [chemical weapons] would require
the assembling of production equipment into a single integrated
facility, creating an infrastructure readily detectable by the
strategic intelligence capabilities of the United States. The
CIA has clearly stated on several occasions since the termination
of inspections in December 1998 that no such activity has been
detected.’
As for biological weapons,
‘The Iraqis do have enough equipment to carry out laboratory-scale
production of BW agent. However, without an infusion of money
and technology, expanding such a capability into a viable weapons
program is a virtual impossibility. Contrary to popular belief,
BW cannot simply be cooked up in the basement; it requires a large
and sophisticated infrastructure, especially if the agent is to
be filled into munitions. As with CW, the CIA has not detected
any such activity concerning BW since UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq.’
US ‘Won’t Take Yes For An
Answer’
No conclusions can be drawn regarding
Iraqi weapons programmes without in-country monitoring, but the
best way to secure that monitoring is to move to a less confrontational
inspection programme, and show willingness to lift, and not merely
suspend, sanctions, according to Ritter.
US policy is heading
in the other direction. The likely trigger for a new US military
campaign will be the demand for UN weapons inspectors to return
to Iraq, a demand phrased in order to elicit an Iraqi refusal.
‘Key figures in the White
House believe that demands on Saddam to re-admit United Nations
weapons inspectors should be set so high that he would fail to
meet them unless he provided officials with total freedom.’ (Times,
16 Feb. 2002, p. 19) A US intelligence official said the White
House ‘will not take yes for an answer’. (Guardian, 14
Feb. 2002, p. 1)
Timing
Estimates as to when the US intends
to launch the war vary wildly. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
has been reported as being ‘sympathetic for a campaign starting
as early as this spring’.(Sunday Times, 3 Feb. 2002, p.
23) Other reports say that ‘Military action aimed at ousting Saddam
Hussein from control of Iraq, while seen as urgent, would not
begin until the end of this year at the earliest.’ (Sunday
Telegraph, 10 Feb. 2002, p. 28)
‘Washington appears ready
to wait until after the United Nations security council debates
a new sanctions regime in May, when further demands will be made
for UN weapons inspectors to have access to Iraq.’ ‘Having cried
wolf so loudly this time, [Mr Bush] will scarcely be able to return
to Capitol Hill next year with nothing to show for it.’ (Independent
on Sunday, 17 Feb. 2002, p. 23) ‘President Bush has vowed
to topple Saddam Hussein within a year... says a leading diplomatic
source.’ (Daily Telegraph, 16 Feb. 2002, p. 12) ‘The long
preparations required for a 200,000-strong invasion force... could
also delay an invasion until the autumn.’ (Sunday Times,
17 Feb. 2002, p. 29) The period between June and Nov. 2002 seems
the most likely period for the initiation of hostilities.
The
‘Afghan Test’
A fundamental problem is that
military planners have yet to come up with a convincing plan:
‘so far, officials have yet to come up with a plan that meets
"the Afghan test": a low-cost, speedy assault that has
a high probability of toppling President Saddam Hussein.’ (FT,
1 Feb. 2002, supplement p. III)
Washington must decide
whether to try the Afghan route, relying on local opposition forces
supported by US airpower; or to opt for ‘a comparatively compact
assault on Baghdad by three divisions comprising 50,000 troops
who could be deployed in weeks’; or to adopt ‘a long-standing
invasion plan that calls for a force of 200,000 troops to be assembled
over a period of up to three months.’ (Sunday Times, 17
Feb. 2002, p. 28)
The smaller force
could be assembled on US aircraft carriers and in Kuwait, without
having to force unwilling allies in the region to provide bases.
It could also be built up faster, lessening the opportunities
for international opposition to develop. ‘A force of three American
divisions - one airborne, one mechanised and one marine - could
strike swiftly at Baghdad, possibly provoking an immediate coup’.
(Sunday Times, 17 Feb. 2002, p. 28)
‘Leadership Change’ Not ‘Regime
Change’
US leaders, including Secretary
of State Colin Powell, speak of their desire to see ‘regime change’
in Iraq. However, ever since 1991 US administrations have shied
away from provoking fundamental change in Iraq, and have sought
instead ‘an iron-fisted Iraqi junta without Saddam Hussein’, according
to Thomas Friedman, Diplomatic Correspondent of the New York
Times, writing on 7 July 1991: sanctions were there to provoke
a coup to create ‘the best of all worlds’, a return to the days
when Saddam’s ‘iron fist... held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction
of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia.’ In March 1991
this prospect was described by Ahmed Chalabi (now leader of the
Iraqi opposition group the Iraqi National Congress) as ‘the worst
of all possible worlds’ for the Iraqi people. (Quoted in Noam
Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, 1994, p. 9)
The US commitment
‘leadership change’ rather than ‘regime change’ was demonstrated
when Kurds and Shias rose against the regime in March 1991: the
US granted permission to Baghdad to use helicopter gunships against
the rebels, refused to release captured arms dumps to rebel forces,
and refused to intervene to defend the rebellions. Richard Haass,
director for Near East affairs for the US National Security Council,
explained in March 1991, ‘Our policy is to get rid of Saddam,
not his regime.’ (Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes:
The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein, HarperCollins 1999, p.
37) ‘Washington’s calculation is that a break-up of Iraq would
fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Middle East, especially
if it led to the creation of an independent Kurdistan. Turkey,
a steadfast US ally with a large Kurd minority, would be destabilised.
Iran could exploit the vacuum.’ (FT, 1 Feb. 2002, supplement
p. III)
Sparing
the Republican Guard
A n officer involved in US planning
says, ‘Our question was, "What about the day after?"
For example, do you take the Republican Guard [the military unit
most loyal to Saddam] and disarm it? Or is it preferable to turn
it from having a capability to protect Saddam to a capability
to protect Iraq?’ (New Yorker, 24 Dec. 2001, p. 63) Protect
Iraq from fragmentation, that is.
In Feb. 1991, large elements of the
Republican Guard, including the Hammurabi Heavy Division, the
most powerful single force in the Republican Guard, were boxed
in near Basra, almost certainly about to be destroyed, when President
Bush Sr. called a ceasefire, preserving this central pillar of
the regime. It appears that under President Bush Jr. military
planning is governed by the same desire to preserve the military
regime in Iraq - the Republican Guard is noticeably absent from
the targeting plans being floated in the media.
The Illegality of the US War
The US does not, to date,
have a legal mandate for serious military intervention.’ (Economist,
26 Jan. 2002, p. 59) Lord Healey, former Defence Secretary and
leading right-winger within the Labour Party, said during Operation
Desert Fox in Dec. 1998 there was ‘no question’ that the US bombing
was unlawful: ‘It is illegal to attack with bombs targets in a
sovereign country without direct authorisation from the Security
Council.’ (Daily Telegraph, 21 Dec. 1998) No such authorisation
has been given, or is being sought, for the new US war on Iraq.
ARROW
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